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I. SUMMARY
The brake control system is critically linked to total Space
Shuttle vehicle performance in that it has a direct effect on the
economics and safety of operation of the vehicle. Payload factors
can be governed by the vehicle stopping ability. The payload capability
can be drastically reduced by excess weight in the overall landing gear
system or specifically, in one of its subsystems such as the braking
system.
To serve as an introduction and background on commercially avail-
able modern antiskid systems, the first task exercise explained and
described these systems. System operational details and system control
philosophies vere presented for each system as veil as a modern air-
craft application for each system. Antiskid systems on the Concorde
(SPAD System), Boeing 7^ 7 and Advanced 737 (Hydro-Aire Mark III System),
Boeing SST (Bendix Ship Command System), and Lockheed L-1011 (Goodyear
System) were described. In addition to the basic aircraft braking opti-
mization, the antiskid system descriptions also presented such functions
as locked wheel protection and touchdown protection.
Once the four systems were described the basic antiskid systems
were applied to the Space Shuttle vehicle and graded on their applica-
bility. It was found that all four systems could successfully be im-
plemented on the Shuttle, but that some would lend themselves to this
application more easily than others. Based on such items as relative
complexity, susceptibility to noise vibration, and difficulty in im-
plementation the four systems were rated in this order of preference:
Hydro-Aire Mark III System, Goodyear L-1011 System, Bendix SST System
and SPAD Concorde System. This rating is strictly based on descriptive
information made available by the manufacturers. Some of the informa-
tion was not too detailed so an accurate evaluation could not be made.
Actual hardware systems from some of these manufacturers were evaluated
in the laboratory on a brake control simulator in Section VT of
this program. This is a far more accurate evaluation of the
systems. Unfortunately, all suppliers did not participate in the
laboratory screening so the descriptive evaluation is the only
available information on these systems.
The systems were not assessed from a cost standpoint. Since
none of these systems ere rated for space craft use, their cost
for Space Shuttle use would not be accurately determined at this
time. From another standpoint the top two contenders have had
extensive use and experience in commercial and military aircraft
and have shown themselves to be relatively trouble free.
In the second task of this contract several studies were
made of new brake control system concepts. A braking concept based
on antiskid system control by utilizing measured brake torque and
its properties is presented in detail. To maximize braking,
developed ground force must be kept at a maximum. In an optimal
control system the ground force must be known. Since it is not
practical to measure ground force directly, several methods are
shown how this variable can be constructed using measured brake
torque. A system is presented detailing how this concept might
be implemented. It is shown that a system already uses a form
of this concept in its operation, SPAD.
Another skid control system concept is presented which deals
with wheel deceleration control. This system concept is embodied
in the Boeing developed Boeing Closed Loop System. This exper-
imental antiskid system is presented in detail for system descrip-
tion and analysis. Details of the system design and operation
are presented in this section and later on in the lab screening
section results of the Closed Loop lab tests are presented and
discussed. The results show the system to be competent although
both industry systems which were tested, Hydro-Aire and Bendix,
demonstrate better performance. In concept and design the Closed
Loop system is relatively simple and therefore has an advantage
over more complex systems requiring more circuitry.
The third task dealt with redundancy considerations which
were based on the Boeing Advanced 737- Three ground rules were
defined based on assumptions made about the mission requirements
of the Space Shuttle. These ground rules were used to analyze
what implementation was required to provide for an antiskid con-
trol system with electronic Fail Operational/Fail Operational/
Fail Safe capability and hydromechanical Fail Operational/Fail
Safe capability. To aid in this redundancy study, Fault Tree
Analysis was used. Both the Advanced 737 and 7^7 brake control
system were analyzed and their fault trees are presented for
study.
The three ground rules that were defined each required a
different level of redundancy. Ground rule 3 only required one
operating brake on each side of the shuttle vehicle. Ground rule
2 required that any three brakes be operational. Ground rule 1
required that all four brakes be operational. To meet the
electronic as well as hydromechanical operational requirements
obviously dictate a much greater degree of redundancy for ground
rule 1 than 3. Tables were prepared that show the expected
probabilities for each system for given ground rules. An expected
system weight is also included to indicate what each level of
redundancy requires in terms of weight penalty.
In addition to the detailed system implementations alternates
were suggested which although do not have the strict degree of re-
dundancy required per given ground rule, do have an extremely
remote probability of failure. These alternatives do achieve
nearly the same probabilities of failure while simplifying the
implementation in terms of cost and weight.
The fourth task involved establishing an analog-hydraulic
computer simulation of the Space Shuttle which was then used to
screen the participating vendor systems. A complete set of tests
were established especially for the Space Shuttle vehicle and
each system was subjected to these tests. Of the four antiskid
system manufacturers invited only Hydro-Aire and Bendix agreed to
participate. To add completeness to the second task description
of the Boeing Closed Loop system it was screened along with the
other two systems in this fourth section. Ample data reduction
and description are presented for a representative set of tests
each system was subjected to, so that along with the preliminary
descriptions presented in Section III, the Hydro-Aire and Bendix
systems are thoroughly analyzed for performance. Goodyear and
S.P.A.D. system performance rating was not possible because of
their absence from the screening tests.
The three systems that were tested were given a weighted
point total with the result that the Hydro-Aire and Bendix system
scored virtually the same grade. In stopping distance performance
the Hydro-Aire system had the edge, while in stability the Bendix
system was first. Both systems were found to be qualified for
Space Shuttle use from a stopping performance standpoint. Other
factors such as manufacturing techniques and how applicable they
are to space flight use were not judged. However, there appears
to be no impediment in this respect for either system.
The final task presented criteria for hardware used for the
antiskid system on the Space Shuttle. Tests were run using the
Boeing Closed Loop system that established trends that are helpful
during design stages of the system. Design considerations such
as brake line length, brake actuator hydraulic volume, brake
torque dynamics, and antiskid valve design were analyzed. Using
the results of these tests show that the proper choice of valve,
and the proper combination of brake volume, brake line length can
result in a better responding hydraulic system. Since any re-
duction in hydraulic phase lag is beneficial, this approach is
certainly worth careful analysis and design. Brake torque re-
sponse is shown to be critical in the system performance. The
less phase lag from the brake the better the system's performance
and stability will be. In general, the antiskid system im-
plementation must be looked at from a total system standpoint in
that all aspects of the design are important to the performance
and stability of the braking system.
II. IHTRODUCTIOH
This document describes the work completed in the five specific
tasks undertaken under Contract HAS 8-278614-. The nature of work con-
ducted under this contract is a research study on a brake control sys-
tem for use on the Space Shuttle vehicle. This work involved five
tasks each designated to provide information on the design requirements
and the utility of existing brake control systems on Space Shuttle.
The following will serve to briefly introduce each task:
In Section III, the first task, trade studies were conducted of
existing antiskid braking systems with respect to applicability and
compatibility to the Space Shuttle. Included in these investigations
were the systems similar to those used on the Concorde (SPAD), Boeing
7U7 and Advanced 737 (Hydro-Aire Mark III), Boeing SST (Bendix), and
Lockheed L-1011 (Goodyear). A technical evaluation of these systems
was conducted on their applicability and compatibility to the Space
Shuttle in terms of complexity, cost and maintenance.
In Section IV, the second task, trade studies of new brake control
system concepts were undertaken so that design risks could be identified
for implementing on the Space Shuttle. Also an alternate antiskid sys-
tem was presented and tested. This system derives its control from
wheel deceleration.
In Section V, the third task, techniques for implementing a
system with electronic Fo/Fo/Fs and hydromechanics! Fo/Fs capability
was investigated. Tradeoff and alternate designs were also looked at
to assess the advantages of reducing redundancy requirements from a
cost and weight standpoint.
In Section VI, the fourth task, extensive computer, hardware
simulation investigations were performed which included the principle
Space Shuttle landing gear characteristics and vehicle parameters
provided by NASA/MSFC. Early utilization of a antiskid simulation in
the Space Shuttle design stages can be extremely cost effective. This
ensures that the braking system can perform to its maximum and also
identify potential problems early in the design to ensure a cost effec-
tive development and flight test program. In this study, each partici-
pating vendor antiskid system was subjected to laboratory screening tests
and the results of each were graded according to a designated point
system to give some insight into the applicability and compatibility
of these systems to Space Shuttle operation.
In Section VTI, the fifth task, preliminary hardware characteris-
tics were established for Space Shuttle skid control system hardware.
Subjects covered were antiskid valve, wheel speed transducer, brake
torque characteristics, etc. The intent is to specify criteria for the
brake control system as well as related systems so that optimum total
system performance can be identified in the early design.
III. TRADE STUDIES OF EXISTING INDUSTRY ANTISKID SYSTEMS
Trade studies of existing state-of-the-art antiskid systems have
been conducted. Each system is described with the help of block dia-
grams and illustrations as to its implementation on the subject aircraft.
Included in this study are the systems used on the Lockheed L-1011
(Goodyear System), Boeing 7^7 and Advanced 737 (Hydro-Aire Mark III
System), Boeing 2707-300 (Bendix System), and Concorde (SPAD System).
Each antiskid system is then rated as to its applicability and com-
patibility to a Space Shuttle vehicle.
DESCRIPTION OF THE GOODYEAR (LOCKHEED L-1011) SKID CONTROL SYSTEM
The Lockheed L-1011 skid control system is the latest Goodyear
system developed for a large jet transport aircraft. It is a repre-
sentative Goodyear state-of-the-art antiskid system and was, therefore,
chosen for study in the program. A description of this system follows.
The eight main wheels of the L-1011 aircraft are each provided
with skid protection by the Goodyear Skid Control System. Each wheel
has its own wheel speed sensor, control circuit and electro-hydraulic
servo valve. An electrically operated valve allows the pilot to select
either the normal or alternate hydraulic system. These systems share
a common skid control circuit but each has its separate valve driver.
Hydraulically the two systems are completely separated, having their
"own power supply, metering valve, and antiskid valve. The two hydraulic
systems tie into each brake through a single line via a shuttle valve.
In addition to normal skid protection, locked wheel protection is
provided for each of the eight main wheels as a backup control. There
are two locked wheel arming circuits associated with the eight main
wheels, one grouping the inboard wheels, the other the outboard. When
the four wheel speeds are above the locked wheel arming point, locked
wheel protection is applied to all four associated wheels. If any of
these four wheels drops below a preset speed value, the locked wheel
circuit will fully release the brake pressure to that wheel. At
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very lov taxi speeds the locked wheel protection drops out to permit
normal braking during taxiing. Each locked wheel arming circuit has
a memory to provide protection for a length of time even if all four
wheels lock up simultaneously.
In addition to providing skid control during normal braking, the
system protects each braked wheel upon touchdown such that no metered
pressure can be applied to the brake until the airplane is sensed to
be on the ground. On the L-1011 airplane this is accomplished by a
squat switch on each main gear. Full brake release signals are
applied to each brake until the wheels have spun up to a level to
override this signal or the squat switch signal is removed by com-
pression of tne shock struts. Thereafter brake pressure can be applied
and the antiskid system can operate normally.
Tne L-1011 Goodyear Skid Control System is represented by the
block diagram in Figure 1. Each braked wheel has its own transducer
which produces an AC signal with frequency proportional to wheel speed.
This signal is received by the frequency DC converter where it is
changed to an analog DC voltage proportional to wheel speed. The
signal is a continuous monitor of wheel speed and is applied to three
control loops of the skid control system. These three control loops
are responsible for »n ranges of brake control operation. One loop,
called the auxiliary loop,is responsible for both locked wheel and
touchdown protection and has already been described. The remaining
two, the major and minor loops, are responsible for the main skid
control function. The minor loop will be described first as it serves
as an initialization to the major loop.
The minor control loop consists mainly of the deep skid detector
which contains both memory and skid threshold circuitry. Its opera-
tion also involves elements common to the other loops. These include
the frequency converter, voltage amplifier, current driver and anti-
skid valve. The wheel speed signal is continually monitored in the
Figure 1. GOODYEAK ANTISKID SYSTEM SCHEMATIC (LOCKifEEI) L-1011 )
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minor control loop. When a wheel speed departure from synchronous
speed exceeds the deep skid detector threshold level, input signals
are provided to both the voltage amplifier and modulator. The voltage
amplifier signal immediately sends a full release signal to the valve
current driver causing full brake pressure release. The deep skid
signal input to the modulator serves as the first step or initializa-
tion procedure in the major control loop which is described later.
Throughout the antiskid operation the deep skid detector monitors
the wheel speed so that no skids in excess of the threshold departure
level will go undetected and uncontrolled. Upon recovering of the
wheel velocity the minor loop control is removed and subsequent braking
control, within the threshold departure is handled by the major control
loop.
The major control loop is the dominant control in the system and
as such involves the most complexity. Compared to the minor loop which
is an on-off discontinuous control, the major loop provides continuous
brake modulation and consequently smoother braking control. Elements
associated with this loop are as follows: deceleration detector, feed
forward circuit, modulator, summer and frequency compensator. The
modulator consists of an Initialization circuit, an analog switch and
integrator, and an adaptive deceleration reference. Basically the
major loop provides control by providing brake pressure modulation
which is proportional to wheel speed deceleration.
Wheel speed is continually monitored by the deceleration detector.
Since the following description applies to the major control loop,
assume that the previous skid required control correction from the
minor loop and that once the wheel recovered the remaining control
involved only the major loop. Thus the deceleration detector will
only be seeing skids of less than the minor loop threshold velocity
departure. During this time while the minor loop is controlling, the
deep skid detector provides a signal to the initialization circuit
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which is proportional to the time duration of the skid. The error
signal generated at the summing junction results from initialization,
deceleration detector, and Adaptive Deceleration Reference (ADR)
inputs. This error is integrated by the integrator circuit and its
magnitude is determined by size of error signal. Other factors
affecting integrator signal magnitude include time and integrator
gain.
The deceleration error generated at the summing Junction (See
Figure l) is established by referencing the deceleration detector
and initialization signal from the deep skid detector to the level
from the ADR. To adapt to varying runway conditions, the ADR circuit
requires several extra Inputs. These are feedback from the integrator
and inputs from both deep skid and deceleration detectors. When a
deep skid is encountered (change in wheel velocity greater than the
minor loop threshold) the ADR level is lowered from its normal value,
but returns again to a higher reference level during skid recovery.
During this time the braked wheel has turned around from the skid
deceleration and begins spinning back up to synchronous wheel speed.
When the wheel has completely spun up the deceleration detector level
drops to zero so that the summing junction produces a deceleration error
due to the presence of an ADR signal. The error signal is integrated
resulting in a gradual increase of brake pressure which eventually
precipitates another skid. This has the effect of reversing the
deceleration error signal since now the signal from the deceleration
error is something greater than zero. Summing this up with the ADR
signal produces an error signal with an opposite sign. This has the
immediate effect of reversing the direction of the integrator causing
brake pressure decrease. Assuming this control action has sufficient
authority to correct the wheel skid, the skidding wheel will regain
synchronous speed, deceleration detector signal will drop to zero
again and the entire process repeats.
Inputs from the deceleration detector and integrator are used
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to enable the ADR to conform to the varying decelerations such that
system efficiency is kept high. Thus the ADR level is continually
changing due to varying runway conditions. Other components in the
major loop include a lead circuit to anticipate and quicken the sys-
tem response. Its input comes from the deceleration detector and
output is fed to the summer. The summer combines signals from both
the feed forward and the integrator. The summation of these signals
is then input to the frequency compensation circuit. This circuit
is designed to compensate dynamically for the signal attentuation in
the hydraulics at higher frequencies. It also has the effect of
extending system response to a higher frequency range. This serves
to help stabilize the tendency to excite fore and aft gear oscilla-
tions.
The Goodyear L-1011 wheel speed transducer shown in Figure 2 is
unique in that it contains no moving parts. Essentially the trans-
ducer contains two basic elements, the sensor mounted in the axle
and exciter ring mounted in the hub cap. The sensor consists of a
permanent magnet core and four equally spaced poles on its periphery.
Forty-eight equally spaced soft iron teeth inside the exciter ring
rotate about the sensor which produces a fluctuation in the magnetic
field proportional to wheel speed.
A Goodyear antiskid valve is shown in Figure 3. It is a two-
stage valve with flapper nozzle first stage and spool, sleeve second
stage. In the first stage the torque motor consisting of a permanent
magnet and flapper armature operates as part of a hydraulic bridge.
Two orifices in the bride are fixed and the two associated with the
flapper are variable. With no valve signal the first stage is relaxed
with the flapper centered between the two nozzles and flow through
them is equal. As shown in Figure 3; with no valve signal present
the second stage spool position allows full pilot's metered pressure
to the brake. Applying a valve signal deflects the flapper, unbalances
the hydraulic bridge which moves the spool in the second stage and
13
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now acts as a metering device to reduce pressure to the brake. The
spring in the second stage acts to keep the spool in the fully opened
position. During valve operation forces from the spring, balance
piston and hydraulics position the spool until an equilibrium is
reached.
DESCRIPTION OF THE HYDRO-AIRE (BOEING 7^7) SKID CONTROL SYSTEM
The Boeing 7^7 skid control system is one of the latest adapta-
tions of the Hydro-Aire Mark III antiskid system. This system is
representative of Hydro-Aire's latest development and was, therefore,
chosen for this study. A description of this aystem follows.
t
The Hydro-Aire Mark III antiskid system provides individual skid
protection for the sixteen main wheels of the Boeing 7^ 7 airplane.
In the normal braking system, each wheel has its own speed sensor,
antiskid control circuit and electro-hydraulic servo valve. A motor
driven interconnect valve controlled by the pilot allows selection
of the Number k (primary) or Number 1 (secondary) hydraulic system
to power this brake system. (The 7^ 7 has four hydraulic systems).
In addition to the normal system, there is a reserve system
which can be selected by the pilot. This system uses paired wheel
control, i.e., a dual pair of wheels on a truck is controlled by
only one antiskid valve. The valve signal is composed of the highest
control signal from each pair of control circuits so that the wheel
with the lowest runway friction will dictate control to the other
wheel. Both normal and reserve systems have separate pilot metering
valves which are slaved together for pilot input force. Inadvertent
use of both systems together causes no operating difficulties except
the possible reduction of antiskid efficiency. Also the pilot must
exert some additional force to actuate both normal and reserve
metering valves together.
Touchdown protection on the 7^7 is provided through the use
16
of the landing gear logic system. Proximity switches (two per truck)
sense when the airplane is on the ground by having any'two trucks out
of tilt across the airplane. This condition provides a signal from
both the primary and secondary landing gear logic systems grounding
the brake release bias voltage to the antiskid system velocity compar-
ator, (See Figure k). This allows normal antiskid operation when the
pilot meters sufficient pressure to cause tire skidding. Wheel spinup
will override the touchdown protection signal permitting normal brak-
ing if the air/ground switches are not activated upon touchdown.
Locked wheel protection is provided for each wheel having anti-
skid protection. Four sets of four wheel groups are used. Both front
and rear left outboard wing gear wheels are paired together with the
right front and rear inboard body gear wheels. This same sequence
is used to combine the remaining three locked wheel groups. In each
four-wheel group each wheel control circuit has three other velocity
references besides its own to provide locked wheel protection reference.
A memory circuit for each wheel provides locked wheel protection even
if all four wheels in a group are locked simultaneously.
The Mark III skid control system is represented by Figure 4 in
a simplified, but functional form. A transducer is used in each
braked wheel to provide instantaneous wheel speed information. The
wheel speed transducer is a frequency modulating device which produces
an AC signal with frequency proportional to wheel speed. This signal
passes through a squaring network in the control circuit, then is fed
into a demodulator, which is called the frequency converter in the
block diagram. The signal emerging from the converter is a DC analog
voltage that directly varies with wheel speed.
The aircraft velocity and deceleration reference is provided by
the reference deceleration and reference velocity functions shown
in the block diagram. At wheel spinup the velocity comparator develops
an error signal which forces the velocity reference to increase until
the error signal ceases. In this manner the simulated reference
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airplane is initialized at touchdown for the braking condition to
follow.
The reference deceleration function provides an output which is
the derivative of the gradually changing component of the wheel velo-
city, and thus is proportional to aircraft deceleration. During the
interval when the aircraft is braking or decelerating, the reference
deceleration serves as the input driving function for the reference
velocity function. Thus the reference velocity function provides an
equivalent aircraft velocity.
Wheel speed information coming from the velocity to DC converter
and the reference velocity are summed at the input to the velocity
comparator becoming the differential input to the comparator. The
output of the comparator is the velocity error signal for that wheel
and it provides the input driving function for the PBM, (Pressure Bias
Modulation), transient control function and lead circuit. These three
functions are responsible for the normal control of the system, each
having a separate control function.
The PBM control is the time integral of the velocity error and
in comparison to the transient control is slower to respond to error
signals. It controls the rate at which pressure is brought on when
the brake pressure is lower than skid pressure. As an integrator it
has the characteristic of serving as a memory device, not allowing
brake pressure to be reapplied at a higher level than that which
previously caused a skid. This also serves to help the system adapt
to varying runway conditions.
The transient control is characterised by a fixed gain and thres-
hold. Its input is the velocity error coming from the velocity com-
parator and thus is a proportional control once the appropriate thres-
hold is exceeded.
The remaining control element, lead, is in the form of a velocity
19
error rate, and is coupled into the summing amplifier. Since it
represents the rate of velocity change, a differentiation, it provides
a dynamic lead function which anticipates and initiates the brake
pressure modulation to help control skids. The transient control
provides the main recovery from skids, while the lead control is
used to quicken the system response thus improving efficiency.
Appropriate use of lead control can also improve overall system strut
damping by way of dynamic compensation.
The remaining system components include the summing amplifier
and valve driver. Signals from the FBM, transient and lead controls
are summed together by the summing amplifier and this output is the
driving function for the valve driver. Essentially the valve driver
provides current for the servo valve for a given voltage input from
the summing amplifier.
To summarize the description of the Mark III system, a typical
skid cycle will be described. As braking is initiated, PBM will
always attempt to bring on more brake pressure so that eventually
the braked wheel will begin to develop a slip and then go into an
actual skid. This condition will develop an error signal in the
velocity comparator since the reference velocity and wheel speed
signal will begin to disagree. The responses to this skid condition
are described in the order of normal occurrence. Any change in the
wheel speed signal such as a skid will develop a signal from the
reference deceleration function. This will tend to drive down the
value of the reference velocity and also provide a signal to the
summing amplifier. Since the reference deceleration signal is a
derivative of the wheel speed, it tends to anticipate or lead the
correction signal to the summing amplifier. After the velocity
error exceeds a certain threshold, the transient control responds
and continues skid pressure correction proportional to the magnitude
of the velocity error. To insure that the same brake pressure is
not reapplied after a skid, the velocity error drives down the value
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of the PBM so that it has a lower value than that previous to this
skid. As soon as the velocity error signal is decreased by virtue
of the wheel spinning up again, the transient and lead functions
disappear, leaving the PBM to regain control, re-apply brake pressure
and increase brake pressure until the entire cycle is repeated again.
The Hydro-Aire Mark III valve is shown in Figure 5. It is a
two-stage valve with a flp.pper, nozzle type first stage and spool,
sleeve second stage. The permanent magnet torque motor in the first
stage operates the flapper. The hydraulic bridge built around the
flapper consists of two fixed and two variable nozzles. Movement of
the flapper unbalances the bridge with a resultant pressure differ-
ential applied to the second stage spool. Movement of this spool
from the relaxed position serves to reduce pilot's metered pressure
to the brake. The forces on the spool work to position it until an
equilibrium position is reached. The value is shown in its relaxed
position, i.e., no current to the first stage.
The wheel speed transducer used in the Mark III system is shown
in Figure 6. This device is self-contained and is mounted in the
axle. The bearing mounted rotor is driven by a bellows mounted in
the hub cap and has the advantage of eliminating any undesirable
effects from misalignment. Both the rotor and the stator are made
of ferrous material and have 200 teeth. A magnetic field is estab-
lished by supplying current to the stator coil from the antiskid
circuit. As the rotor turns, the alternating alignment and misalign-
ment of the teeth in the rotor and the stator vary the reluctance in
the magnetic circuit. This results in an alternating current in the
supply current which generates an AC frequency proportional to wheel
speed.
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DESCRIPTION OF THE HYDRO -AIRE (BOEIHG 737) SKID CONTROL SYSTEM
The Boeing Advanced 737 skid control system is included in this
study because it represents a good comparison case for the space
shuttle redundancy requirements study. The control circuitry is very
similar to the already described 7^ 7 system, and the reader is referred
to that description. The greatest difference in design between the
737 and 7^ 7 systems is largely that due to the difference in number
of braked vheels. With only four wheels, the 737 system had to be
laid out vith far greater emphasis on symmetrical failure modes to
meet safety requirements. For this reason the two inboard wheels
are powered by one hydraulic system while the two outboard are powered
by a separate system. Pilot's control of flow to the brakes is
accomplished through two dual metering valves. Each dual valve con-
trols flow to the brakes on one side of the airplane.
Touchdown protection is provided to only inboard wheels on this
airplane. With only one air to ground squat switch, a single failure
in the air mode would mean that at low airplane velocity all four
main brakes would be fully released if a33 four had touchdown protection.
Thus the reason why only two wheels are protected. If brakes are in-
advertently applied prior to touchdown, two protected wheels will
adequately meet safety requirements. Figure 7 represents a simplified
Mark III diagram for the Advanced 737. The basic control components
are functionally the same as found on the 7^ 7 (See Figure k) differing
mainly in their tuning values. These minor differences come about
because of differences in the wheel speed transducers, wheel size,
hydraulic systems and landing gear configurations that exist on these
two airplanes. The description given for the 7^ 7 basic control system
will therefore adequately describe the 737 system. The redundancy
requirements of the 737 system are met by the two separate hydraulic
systems so there is no need for a reserve or backup braking system
like the paired wheel control system on the 7^7 • Each main wheel has
only one control card, transducer and control valve.
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Both touchdown and locked wheel protection on the Advanced 737
provide a valve signal that is 125 percent of the normal full transient
signal. This signal will ensure that the brake pressure is fully
released. Touchdown protection will be present when the wheels are
not spinning and the squat switch is in the air mode. If either the
squat switch ground signal or the wheels spinup conditions occur, the
release signal will disappear and the pilot can meter brake pressure.
During a normal braking stop, if one wheel of a locked wheel pair drops
75 percent below the other, a locked wheel signal will be present at
the valve driver of the locked up wheel. Locked wheels are paired
inboard-inboard and outboard-outboard. If for some reason the squat
switch does not switch to the ground mode after landing, the wheel
speed signal will override as long as the velocity is above a very
low level. At this point the locked wheel signal will reappear pre-
venting any more braking on those wheels that have this protection.
The servo valve used in the 737 system is shown in Figure 8. Com-
pared to the 7^ 7 valve, it is less complicated to manufacture because
it does away with several close tolerance requirements. Referring to
Figure 5 the 7*4-7 second stage spool has two additional forces applied
to the spool. These are eliminated with the 737 type valve by re-
arranging the flow in the second stage. This also requires a change
in the operation of the first stage hydraulic flapper-nozzle.
In the 7^ 7 valve, the neutral flapper position (center position)
produces a balanced hydraulic bridge and forces on the second stage
spool permit full pilot's metered pressure to the brake. In the 737
valve, the neutral position of the flapper is hard over against the
return side nozzle. To get zero brake pressure in the 737 type valve
the flapper must be biased hard over against the metered pressure
nozzle so that first stage nozzle flow is completely cut off. The
second stage spool is spring biased to insure full braking capability
with no current input signal to the valve.
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The 737 transducer shown in Figure 9 is functionally similar to
the 7^ 7 transducer (see Figure 6). In the 737 unit, the rotor is
mounted in a dual roller bearing and axial thrust is absorbed through
a ball at the end of the shaft. This is a slightly different arrange-
ment than the Y^ 7 transducer as Figure 6 will show. The 737 trans-
ducer only has 150 teeth compared to 200 teeth in the improved 7^ 7
unit. (Most of the early jkf airplanes use 50 teeth transducer along
with a different filter in the skid control module).
DESCRIPTION OF THE BENDIX (BOEING 2707-300) SKID CONTROL SYSTEM
The Bendix, Boeing 2707 (USA-SST) skid control system represents
the latest Bendix development in antiskid systems and therefore was
chosen for this study. It* description follows.
The twelve pairs of co-rotating main wheels of the Boeing 2707
(USA-SST) are each provided with individual antiskid protection.
Each wheel pair has its own wheel speed sensor, brake, control circuit,
and electro-hydraulic servo valve. This, the normal system, is
powered hydraulically by the "B" aircraft hydraulic system. The
vehicle also has a standby control system which has its own set of
six paired wheel control circuits, separate hydraulic system and
paired antiskid servo valves. The wheels are paired across the
truck.
If the "B" hydraulic system falls, the system automatically
switches to the standby system. In the event the normal systems
fails other than hydraulically, the pilot can also manually switch
to the standby system. Once in the standby mode and failure of
its hydraulic system occurs (the "D" system on the aircraft), the
standby system can be powered by an auxiliary pump. This pump is
connected into the "D" system plumbing downstream of the normal "D"
system pump and thus serves as a backup power source.
Locked wheel protection is provided in addition to the normal
28
Figure. 9. HYDRO-AIBE M&RK III ANTISKID WHEEL SPEED TRANSDUCER
(BOEING 737)
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antiskid control. The reference velocities of two wheels are paired
together to provide locked wheel reference for each other. The
pairing scheme is equidistant across the airplane with the left for-
ward outboard wheel paired to the right forward inboard wheel. This
scheme is continued through the remaining five pairs of wheels. If
and when a locked wheel occurs during normal antiskid control, the
locked wheel circuit will provide a full release signal to that indi-
vidual wheel. This signal is maintained until the wheel speed recovers
to near synchronous speed when normal antiskid control resumes.
Touchdown protection is also provided in addition to the normal
antiskid protection. There are two air to ground sensors used, one
in the nose and one in the main gear. Prior to landing, when the two
sensors are in the air mode, the touchdown circuit provides a full
brake release signal to all wheels. When the airplane lands, a 5«5
second timer is started either by main gear wheel spinup or the main
gear squat switchs to the ground mode. Brake release signals to all
main wheels then continues until the nose gear squat switches to
ground mode or the 5-5 second interval elapses. At that time normal
braking and antiskid control is possible. This time delay is necessary
to prevent brake application before nose gear touchdown to assure pilot
comfort and structural integrity.
The Bendiz antiskid system can be represented in block diagram
form as seen in Figure 10. In the diagram Just prior to the valve
driver, the summing Junction shows an input called pilot brake appli-
cation signal. In this airplane an electrical system takes the place
of normal cable rigging and metering valve. The pilot's pedals are
connected to multiple rotary LVDT transducers which convey brake appli-
cation signals to the antiskid control system. Then the correct signal
is chosen (mid value logic scheme) and is processed and then sent to
the summing Junction.
i
From this point on, the system performs conventionally, i.e., as
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Figure 10. HENDDC ANTISKID SYSTEM SCHEMATIC (BOEING 2T07-300)
any system with a pilot's brake metering valve, since if the pilot
commands more brake pressure than the tire can handle without skidding,
the skid control system provides a signal which modulates the brake
pressure and provides efficient brake control. Each brake co-rotating
pair of wheels has its own wheel speed transducer. This is an ac
signal with frequency proportional to wheel speed. The frequency con-
verter in the control card doubles frequency, amplifies and squares it,
pulse shapes the squared signal, then demodulates and filters it to
provide a dc signal proportional to wheel r.peed. Thi:; output i:; ;;cnt
to a notch filter which iu tuned to the landing gear natural frequency
and acts to dampen landing gear oscillations. Wheel ^ peed signals
from the converter and notch filter are applied as input signals to
the rest of the control circuitry. In the reference velocity circuit
the wheel speed signal is filtered such that if the speed is suddenly
lowered, the velocity reference input to the error summing junction,
when compared to the wheel speed will develop an error signal. The
reference velocity signal is also multiplied by the slip command
signal which provides a commanded wheel speed.
The slip command channel consists of a differentiator, detector,
monostable flip-flop, amplifier and integrator. These components are
in a straight line in the middle of the diagram. The function of the
slip command circuit is to provide an incremental reduction of slip
which serves to reduce brake torque. When a sufficient deceleration
is detected the flip-flop changes state and after a fixed increment
reverts back to its original state. The result is a pulse signal
of fixed height and width which is amplified and integrated becoming
the slip command signal. This signal is supplied to a multiplier
and is multiplied by the reference velocity signal. The threshold
in the deceleration detector is varied as a function of wheel speed
which acts to provide consistent dynamic response regardless of wheel
speed.
In addition to the gear notch filter a deceleration signal ir:
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fed into the wheel speed error circuit to provide additional damping
of landing gear oscillations.
The wheel speed error signal is generated by summing the two
wheel speed derivative signals and the output from the error amplifier.
This error amplifier signal comes from the summation of the wheel speed
signal from the notch filter and the product signal of slip command
and reference velocity circuit. This summing point signal is then fed
to a multiplier along with the reference velocity signal producing a
function which serves to change the gain of the system as a function
of reference velocity. Finally the multiplier output is fed to the
valve driver to modulate the pilot's commanded brake pressure to
produce efficient braking control.
Basically the Bendix system operates on the principle of command-
ing a fixed slip to the braked wheel. If and when the peak slip is
exceeded the slip command channel produces a pulse signal which drives
the wheel slip back to the stable front side of the tire friction
relationship by reducing brake torque. After the slip command signal
vanishes, the fixed slip command signal will begin increasing brake
torque again such that the system will again search for the peak
friction point.
The Bendix wheel speed transducer is shown in Figure 11. It is
an inductor type alternator which provides a sinusoidal output signal.
The transducer incorporates a 50-tooth permanent magnet rotor supported
by two ball bearings. The eight pole stator with U8 tooth spacing and
the rotor are housed in an aluminum case. The output of the transducer
is 50 Hz per wheel revolution.
The Bendix antiskid valve is shown schedmatically in Figure 12.
It is a two-stage, Jet pipe first stage and spool type second stage
valve. The Jet pipe first stage drives the second stage in propor-
tion to the input signal. With no input current the flow is directed
equally to both receiver inlets since the Jet pipe is positioned
33
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Figure 12. BENDIX ANTISKID SERVO VALVE (BOEING 2707-300)
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directly over them. An input signal deflects the jet torque motor
nozzle to either side, unbalances the flow through the receiver inlets
and drives the second stage spool in the direction of the unbalanced
force. Brake pressure at one end and return pressure at the opposite
end also act to position the spool. Pressure control to the brake
is produced by this adjustment of forces on the spool. When the
commanded brake pressure is reached, the return pressure and brake
pressure serve to balance spool forces.
DESCRIPTION OF THE SPAD (CONCORDE) SKID CONTROL SYSTEM
The SPAD (Manufactured by Hispano - Suiza Division of LaSnecma)
skid control system as it is implemented on the Concorde, represents
the latest SPAD development. It was therefore chosen for this study.
Its description follows.
The eight main gear wheels of the Concorde aircraft are provided
with antiskid protection in the normal brake control system. Each
main gear wheel has its own wheel speed transducer skid control cir-
cuit and electro-hydraulic servo valve. There are also two wheel
speed transducers on the unbraked nose wheels which generate reference
aircraft velocity for the system. The system is comprised of four
separate antiskid control boxes each controlling a dual pair of
wheels on a truck. The electronic control circuit for the normal
brake control system provides for no antiskid system backup. There
is only one valve, one control card and one wheel speed transducer
per main gear wheel.
There are two separate aircraft hydraulic systems available
to power the normal brake control system. The "green" system is
the primary hydraulic power source for the normal brake control
system, but if failure in this "green" system occurs, the "yellow"
hydraulic system is substituted by an automatic change over valve.
Further, the pilot has the option of selecting the normal brake
control system or an emergency system. If the emergency system is
selected, the normal brake control system will be shut down and the
emergency system will be powered by the "yellow" hydraulic system.
This emergency system is without antiskid protection, and the pilot
pedal input is by direct hydraulic metering valves, one for each
side of the airplane, instead of the electronic pedal transducer
system used in the normal control system. All eight main wheel brakes
have a separate provision for emergency brake actuation so that the
normal and emergency systems are completely distinct. As a further
precaution the "yellow" hydraulic system has a separate electric
pump to maintain an accumulator charge in the event of "yellow"
hydraulic pump failure.
In addition to normal antiskid control during braking, there is
a touchdown protection provided such that the main gear wheels have
antiskid protection even before the wheels spin up. This protection
comes about naturally from an initial reference condition built in
to provide reference aircraft velocity before the nose wheels spin up.
There are main gear and nose gear air to ground sensors which provide
signals to furnish the antiskid system with the initial reference
velocity at main gear touchdown. The value of the initial reference
velocity is such that it closely resembles the actual touchdown
velocity. Upon nose gear touchdown the nose wheel transducers provide
the actual aircraft velocity.
Locked wheel protection is provided for each main gear wheel.
If any braked wheel velocity drops below a fixed speed the locked
wheel circuit sends a maximum current signal to the servo valve which
fully dumps the brake pressure to that wheel. Since both nose wheels
provide reference aircraft velocity for all eight main wheel circuits,
there is no main wheel pairing for locked wheel reference in this
system. This is unlike the other antiskid systems which have an
electronic "reference wheel" and require velocity pairing as an
additional safety precaution.
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The SPAD antiskid control system is represented by the simplified
diagram in Figure 13- Wheel speed transducers, which are D.C. tacho-
meters, provide direct velocity signals to the control circuit. The
nose gear tachometer signals provide a continuous aircraft reference
velocity during the landing roll while each main gear tachometer
signal provides direct instantaneous braked wheel speed information.
Assuming the normal antiskid system is in operation, the pilot's pedal
command are electrical signals sent directly to all eight main anti-
skid valves. This eliminates the need for separate brake metering
valves which are in the 7^ 7 and L-1011 systems discussed earlier.
However, the rest of the SPAD antiskid system is like these other
systems, with the control circuit maximizing the braking effort
whenever sufficient brake pressure is metered to cause skidding.
The skid control system has a basic control loop which collects
its main and nose wheel speed inputs at the first summing Junction
(5L\ ) on the diamgram of Figure 13. (Assume that there is no opti-
mizer signal present for this preliminary discussion. The optimizer
function will be described later). The nose wheel speed signal is
multiplied by a gain value "K" which produces a velocity reference
speed reduced by an amount equal to the desired slip velocity. The
desired slip is at the peak of the ground friction force-slip curve.
These inputs summed at the summing Junction provide an error signal
which will drive the amplifier to produce a valve signal so that
brake pressure will increase until the braked wheel slows to the
desired sliding velocity. This is an unstable condition so the
wheel will eventually go deeper into the skid. With no signal from
the optimizer, its rapidly reducing velocity triggers a limit
"safety stop" in the locked wheel protection circuit. This sends
a maximum valve signal through summing junction (£2. ) to fully
release brake pressure. As the wheel velocity recovers, the
locked wheel signal releases the servo valve, allowing normal system
operation to resume.
FIGURE 13. S.P.A.D. ANTISKID SYSTEM SCHEMATIC (CONCOKDE)
Nov assume the optimizer is in the control loop. At the resumption
of antiskid operation, the integrator (see Figure 13) within the opti-
mizer is at an initial condition (flip-flop in its initial state) and
it begins to integrate its input signals such that the brake pressure
steadily increases. As the tire slip is in effect moving up the front
side of the ground friction curve toward the peak friction force, the
"ground force computation" circuit tracks the pseudo ground force
parameter "F". As this value increases the "maximum detector" will
sense the peak force value and compare the continuing ground force
signal to the peak value. The delta force value generated as the
tire slip continues past the peak will grow until a threshold is
exceeded, thus triggering the flip-flop to its opposite state. The
input of the flip-flop "g"1 and aircraft velocity "Va" are multiplied
and Integrated and the resultant signal * V becomes the new optimizer
signal. Changing the state of the flip-flop reverses the direction
of the integrator thus allowing the system to sweep back and forth
across the peak of the ground force-tire slip curve.
If for some reason the flip-flop does not get a command from
the "maximum detector," the "sweep limits" circuit acts to reverse
the state of the "flip-flop" so that the operating point of the
system will still sweep back and forth across the ground force peak.
The sweep limits serve chiefly to enable the optimizer to function
efficiently even though there might not be a detectable ground force
peak.
Although the system can operate efficiently by sweeping between
the wider pre-set sweep limits, the optimizer relies heavily on
detecting the ground force peak for minimum sweep and thus maximum
efficiency. Ground force is not available directly so the valve
current and wheel speed are filtered in the "ground force computation"
circuit to produce a pseudo ground force. The multiplier is used in
the optimizer to keep a constant integrator sweep rate throughout
the range of aircraft velocity.
140
Any time the braked vheel velocity drops below the safety stop
value which acts as a backup to the "sweep limits," the locked wheel
circuit interrupts braking and re-initializes the integrator, maximum
detector and flip-flop. Once wheel velocity recovers, the locked wheel
circuit releases control of the optimizer and allows it to resume its
peak sweeping function.
The touchdown protection circuit also incorporates a low speed
relay which reverts the optimizer integrator to its initial conditions
when the aircraft speed drops below 10$ of its touchdown velocity.
This imposes a constant slippage of the braked wheel at low velocity.
The SPAD antiskid servo valve, shown in Figure 114, is a two-stage
valve. It has a flapper nozzle first stage and a spool type second
stage. In this valve the torque motor has two separate windings, one
controlled by pilot signals and the other by the skid control system.
The first stage flapper creates variable nozzles which control the
two hydraulic signals leading to the second stage. These hydraulic
signals act upon either end of the spool and with the spring force
position the spool in the direction of unbalanced forces. As pressure
is metered to the brake, this force acting on the differential spool
area acts as the sole feedback to halt the motion of the spool and
achieve balance. When there is no first stage signals, the spring
in the second stage ensures that the spool will not prevent full
system pressure from reaching the brake. Thus the pilot pedal
transducer signal must provide a full brake release signal when the
pedals are not depressed.
The SPAD wheel speed transducers (Figure 15) are DC tachometers.
The two nose wheel transducers are gear driven at two times wheel
speed. The eight transducers on the main gear wheels are driven
directly and thus rotate at the instantaneous wheel velocity. These
DC tachometers produce a voltage signal which Is proportional to
wheel speed. The rotor is composed of seven grooves, and has a
Ul
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seven blade commutator. Two carbon brushes are spring loaded against
the commutator. The armature shaft is supported by tvo lubricated
sealed bearings. The permanent magnet core used in the tachometer
is flux stable over the expected range of temperatures.
SUMMARY OF TRADE STUDIES
Historically, antiskid systems on aircraft were designed to
prevent damaging tire lockups during braking. The sole function of
the antiskid system was to detect skids, release brake pressure,
allow the skidding wheel to spin back up, then re-apply brake
pressure. This type of control did indeed prevent tire blowouts,
but offered little in the way of efficient braking.
Antiskid systems have since evolved into what can be called
brake control systems. Modern systems still provide blowout protec-
tion, but their real importance involves providing highly efficient
stopping performance. To do this, the braked wheel must be slowed
below its synchronous speed until the maximum braking force is reached,
i.e., the peak of the mu-slip curve, Figure l6, which is usually about
90 percent of synchronous speed. However, maintaining the precise
wheel speed is difficult because this is an unstable condition where
the tire has a tendency to suddenly go into a much deeper skid. The
ability of a skid control system to maintain control near the peak
of the mu-slip curve is a measure of its efficiency.
The four modern skid control systems chosen for this study all
provide braking control of an efficient nature, while also providing
blowout protection. Since the only information that these skid con-
trol systems have available is wheel speed, the type of control these
systems rely on deals with the wheel speed deceleration, sliding
velocity and percent slip. Each system uses the wheel velocity signal
differently to effect desirable brake control efficiency. A short
summary of the salient features of each system follows.
The Goodyear L-1011 antiskid system produces an electronic
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reference airplane velocity and from this generates the deceleration
error of the braked vheel. Whenever the braked wheel velocity exceeds
a certain deceleration limit corrective brake pressure modulation takes
place. An adaptable deceleration reference is used in this system to
ensure high efficiency over a wide range of operating conditions.
The Hydro-Aire Mark III fkj and 737 systems use an electronic
reference airplane velocity to compare to the braked wheel velocity.
The difference in velocity or delta velocity is used to correct the
brake pressure in proportion to the velocity error signal. This
system is thus able to maintain a high efficiency over a wide range
of operating conditions.
The Bendix 270f-300 (American SST) antiskid system generates an
electronic reference velocity which when compared to the braked wheel
velocity determines an error signal. This signal is used to provide
a commanded fixed slip so that high braking efficiency can be main-
tained. If and when the fixed slip is exceeded a pulse signal from
the slip command modulator reduces brake pressure so that the proper
slip velocity can be re-established.
The SFAD skid control system used on the Concorde airplane gener-
ates its reference airplane velocity from nose wheel tachometers.
This reference is compared to the braked wheel velocity to provide
an error signal which is used to establish a certain sliding velocity.
To find the best velocity an optimizer circuit sweeps the braked
wheel velocity back and forth over a narrow band about the peak ground
friction value.
All four antiskid systems use integral control as a memory device
to keep the system operating at the peak ground force. Each system
also uses dynamic lead compensation to help in quickening the response
to wheel skids and thus improving performance.
SYSTEM RATINGS
The four major vendor's systems have been described as they vere
implemented for a specific application, i.e., Hydro-Aire on the '(k"(
and 737, Goodyear on the L-1011, Bendix on the 2707 (SST) and SPAD
on the Concorde. Each of these systems would require some configura-
tion changes for space shuttle vehicle application. However, the
basic antiskid functions would not be altered and can be assumed to
apply as described.
Each system offers certain advantages over the others and all
are capable of efficiently performing their intended function. This
is evident from the fact that each was selected for use on aircraft
designated for commercial and/or military use. However, some differ-
ences do exist which can influence the applicability to space shuttle.
The differences are relative complexity, susceptibility to noise
vibration, difficulty in implementation and system cost. These systems
have been rated under four categories for this study, each having a
maximum of 25 points.
Under the first item, complexity, the four systems were rated
as follows:
Hydro-Aire
Goodyear
SPAD
Bendix
24
22
19
19
Both the Hydro-Aire and Goodyear systems were given high ratings
since both systems achieve the intended functions with relative sim-
plicity of design. The SPAD system is slightly more complicated be-
cause of its wheel speed transducers. The most complex is the Bendix
system which has a much greater number of control circuitry components.
Rating under the second item, susceptibility to noise and vibration,
is as follows:
Hydro -Aire 23
Bendlx 21
Goodyear 19
SPAD 18
Discussion of the above rating will be dealt with under two
categories: wheel speed transducer and power line noise.
Wheel Speed Transducer
o L-1011, Goodyear
The L-1011 transducer is an exciter ring-sensor device. Two
types of non-concentric errors can exist with this type of
transducer. The first type forms a constant gap offset and
does not modulate the transducer output signal. A fixed off-
set gap is caused by mounting the exciter ring off center with
the sensor centered with respect to the axle. The second con-
centric error is caused when the sensor is off center. This
forms a traveling gap causing an amplitude modulation of the
transducer output signal. Vibration or installation error can
cause either or both types of concentric errors.
A variable reluctance sensor of this type has an output of about
0.5 volts rms, producing k2 pulses per revolution. Such a low
pulse count requires considerable filtering at the converter
output to smooth the dc analog voltage which incorporates a time
delay. The low output signal, being just slightly over the noise
level, would be the minimum acceptable.
o Wheel Speed Transducer, 2707-300 Bendix
The 2707-300 transducer is an inductor type alternator produc-
ing 50 pulses per revolution at about 0.7 volts rms. This type
of a transducer has its stator and rotor mounted in a housing
where the spacing is provided by its own bearings. This system
is still susceptible to fixed and variable gap errors but to
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a lesser degree than the L-1011 system. A third error with this
type of transducer would be a non-concentric drive where the
drive path would be eliptical rather than circular. This error
produces frequency modulation of the transducer output. It is
minimized by a long drive arm. The voltage output and frequency
is approximately the same as that of the L-1011 transducer.
o Wheel Speed Transducer, Concorde, SPAD, Hispano Suiza
The SPAD transducer is a tachometer generator type supplying
seven pulses per revolution at an open circuit voltage of
about 6 volts. The low frequency could imply that quite heavy
filtering is required for operation at low speed. Increased
maintenance may be encountered with a carbon brush system. The
high signal output insures an adequate signal to noise ratio.
o Wheel Speed Transducer, 7^7-737, Hydro-Aire
The 7^7 wheel speed transducer is an inductor alternator trans-
ducer similar in design to Bendix. It is current excited to
produce about a 5-volt output insuring an adequate signal to
noise ratio. The early 7^7 transducers produced 50 pulses per
revolution, which was changed to 200 pulses per revolution on
later airplanes. The Advanced 737 transducer produces 150
pulses per revolution. The high frequency requires very little
filtering and thus a minimum time delay.
Power Line Noise
Antiskid control units can be powered directly from an aircraft
supply if some means is provided to protect the control circuitry
from such a noisy environment. Such a means takes the form of a
buffer supply, pre-regulator, regulator and filters, used singularly
or combinations thereof as requirements dictate.
It is practical to limit the load to one supply to an antiskid
pair of wheels (left inboard - right inboard, etc.) so that any power
failure cannot cause a total loss of braking and so that any loss that
does occur will not unbalance the braking action, endangering steering
control.
In the case where a number of different level outputs are required,
the voltage buildup and decay at turn-on or turn-off should have the same
time constant. A poor design would be a case where the negative power
to an operational amplifier circuit built up much slower than the posi-
tive power to provide unwanted outputs due to control power excursions.
Power Supply
o L-1011, Goodyear
The L-1011 is dependent upon one supply for all braked wheels.
In this case, a single failure in the power supply could cause
loss of a11 antiskid protection. Transformers are used to
isolate the regulated power from voltage fluctuations. The
plus and minus supplies are regulated and filtered. Current
limiters provide protection against overloads and shorts.
Detailed circuits are not available at this time for analysis.
o 270T-300, Bendix
Dual power supplies are used in both normal and standby system.
Each supply contains a current limiter, voltage regulator,
filtering and a dc to dc converter. Physical and electrical
isolation is maintained for both power supplies and their
sources. A high degree of noise rejection isolates the air-
craft noise from the control circuitry. Supply redundancy
prevents a single failure from causing loss of antiskid protec-
tion.
o Concorde, SPAD
An ac power supply is provided common to a braked pair of wheels.
Each wheel control card has its own filtering and regulator. A
single failure cannot cause loss of all antiskid control. Such
a system satisfactorily isolates the aircraft power line noise
from the antiskid control circuitry. Detailed circuitry for
analysis was not provided at this time.
o 7VT-737, Hydro-Aire
Each 7^7 wheel card has its own filtering and regulator. The
regulators are powered off of aircraft dc power. The Advanced
737 has an ac supply for each braked pair of wheels then an
individual regulator and filters for each wheel card. Each
system provides good isolation from transients and power line
noise.
Under the third category, Implementation, the four systems were
rated as follows:
Goodyear 23
Hydro-Aire 23
Bendix 20
SPAD 17
Both the Goodyear and Hydro-Aire systems were rated high since
there was nothing notably deficient in their ability to be implemented
on a Space Shuttle vehicle. Bendix was downrated somewhat because
their complicated circuitry would require somewhat more weight, space
and power. The SPAD system was given the lowest rating since its use
of geared nose wheel transducers for reference speed signal complicates
the installation of this system.
The fourth rating category involves cost. This can be divided
into two sub-categories, initial and maintenance cost. Assuming
initial cost information was available for these systems, it would
represent the implementation of those systems on the related aircraft
chosen for this study. Thus these prices would not reflect the imple-
mentation on the proposed space shuttle and, therefore, would not be
representative. Another factor that must be considered is the quality
control requirements for the skid control system in the Space Shuttle
application.
Conventional aircraft rated skid control hardware would not
qualify for space. For these reasons initial cost information is
not available at this time.
A measure of the anticipated maintenance costs would be reflected
in the degree of complexity of the system and in the service experience
of the equipment. In that respect, the Hydro-Aire and Goodyear systems,
which are the least complex and comprise 99 percent of the free world's
skid control systems now in operation, have been relatively trouble
free.
Based on the foregoing evaluation the main contenders for a space
shuttle role are Hydro-Aire Mark III and Goodyear L-1011 system. In
view of the pending hardware screening efforts the relative position
of all four systems is not considered firmly established. The final
standing of these current systems will be summarized in Section VI,
Laboratory Evaluation of Antiskid Systems.
IV. TRADE STUDIES OF NEW BRAKE CONTROL CONCEPTS
In Section III four antiskid systems are described as they
presently exist on current aircraft (except Bendix-SST system which
was to be on the B2707-300). This description indicated how conven-
tional systems produce braking system control. What will be under-
taken in this present section is a description and discussion of
several alternate system approaches. First the concept of using
measured brake torque as a control parameter will be analyzed as
well as a proposed system incorporating this approach. Next the
Boeing Closed Loop antiskid system will be described. This is a
completely functioning system that has been actually flight tested
some years ago. This system was also tested in the laboratory along
with the other vendor systems and the results will be presented in
Section VI.
DISCUSSION OF BRAKE TORQUE AS A MEANS OF ANTISKID CONTROL
Brake torque has been proposed as a parameter to be utilized in
a brake control system. In any given conventional brake control sys-
tem, brake torque is being controlled indirectly by the action of the
system through modulation of the antiskid valve. Because of inherent
system lags and unknown gain values, it would appear logical to in-
vestigate the use of brake torque feedback in a more active way.
Before brake torque can be used it first must lend itself to
measurement. For a truck type main gear braking system, the equalizer
rod force can provide a measure of brake torque through the use of a
strain gauge. Except for the brake bearing forces which can be neglected,
the equalizer rod reacts brake, torque to the strut inner cylinder. For
brake systems having only two wheels per strut, the measurement of
brake torque becomes more difficult. Again strain gauges can be used
to measure axle strain, but unfortunately the resultant signal would
reflect more than just the desired brake torque. The problem arises
from additional axle torsional loads caused by conditions other than
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just the desired brake torque. Other means might be used to detect
brake torque on a dual wheel configuration such as the use of load
cells, but not without a weight penalty.
Assuming that by some means brake torque could be measured, it
is not unlikely that the condition of the signal would be unacceptable.
The environment of the brake, both heat and vibration levels would
cause extreme reliability problems in service. Next the noise content
of the brake torque signal might easily "swamp" out the torque infor-
mation. Squeal and chatter oscillations would cause an excessively
noisy signal, for instance. However, supposing these problems could
be solved, the next step is to decide how to utilize the brake torque
signal so that it could be a meaningful control function.
Three means for incorporating brake torque into the skid control
system will be discussed: a system that uses brake torque alone for
its control; a system that uses wheel speed and a brake torque simu-
lation for its control; a system that uses wheel speed plus the
measured brake torque for its control.
The reliance on brake torqae solely to control the braked wheel
would have at least two obstacles to overcome. First the brake torque
information would not be sufficient to determine the velocity, i.e.,
slip condition of the wheel. Except for some extraneous signals
(this would apply only to two-brake struts where the axle is instru-
mented to measure torque) the only means to create torque is to apply
some brake pressure to determine if a wheel is turning. Yet if the
wheel is locked up, the application of brake pressure would certainly
rule out the wheel spinning up. This locked wheel condition could
happen during hydroplaning or at the low velocity portion of a braking
run.
Secondly, the installed torque for any given brake is too depen-
dent on brake usage history and maintenance to establish a meaningful
analog of brake torque, i.e., the relationship between torque and
brake pressure is not necessarily a fixed parameter. Scaling one
brake for a certain brake torque signal level would not hold for
another brake or for the same brake at a different point in the
wear history of the same brake. The scatter in brake torque gain
from one brake to another would rule out any simple use of the
brake torque signal for a continuous control signal. The skid
control system would be designed for a specific brake torque gain
level, yet from one brake to the next there would be no consistency.
The result would be a system that would perform inefficiently with
one brake and maybe not at all with another. Performance results
would certainly be unpredictable. Therefore brake torque alone is
not sufficient as a control parameter.
The next two systems use brake torque feedback along with the
more conventional use of the brake wheel velocity. Neither system
uses brake torque directly but instead creates a ground force signal
from the brake torque and wheel speed signal. To better appreciate
the reason why ground force is utilized, some analysis of the typical
wheel dynamics of a braked wheel are necessary. The simplified
diagram of such a system appears in Figure IT. The simplified equa-
tion of the wheel dynamics will be presented,
GROUND TORQUE - BRAKE TORQUE = I<X
where I represents all the rotational inertias in the wheel, tire
and brake. These are assumed constant over a given braking run.
The term oc represents the deceleration-acceleration of the tire,
wheel, and rotating brake parts. This expression is deliberately
simplified for ease of description by ignoring other higher order
effects such as tire footprint displacement and other strut dynamics
due to other braked wheels sharing the same strut.
For a given brake torque level, the ground torque will tend to
counteract until no wheel deceleration is present. As long as the
wheel operates on the front side of tne ground force curve (see
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Figure 16) the ground torque will "be forced to react sufficient torque
to balance the applied "brake torque, i.e., ground torque equals brake
torque. However, by either forcing the brake torque higher, or en-
countering a sudden decrease in the ground torque would cause the wheel
velocity to slide beyond the stable region and cause deceleration of
the wheel in proportion to the torque unbalance. The ground torque
would drop as the wheel approaches lockup and the inertia of the wheel
would for an instant maintain the brake torque until lockup occurs.
Once the wheel is fully locked the ground torque would again equal
the brake torque ignoring strut dynamics which would cause oscilla-
tions in both the ground torque and brake torque in this lockup case.
Inherent in this wheel lockup case is the fact that brake torque,
while being what the skid control system controls, may not be the
driving function in the wheel dynamics equation. For example, the
action as the decelerating wheel passes the unstable ground force
peak is precipitated by the change in ground force. That is, the
ground force leads the brake torque at this time. Its value along
with the higher order inertia! effects, dictates what the brake torque
will be. Brake torque, to have any value, must be reacted by ground
force. With the airplane stopped, braked wheel locked, applying any
amount of brake pressure will not produce any discernable brake
torque. If brake torque is highly dependent upon ground torque, then
the parameter that must be controlled is ground torque.
The expression governing this relationship can be easily obtained
from the wheel dynamics equation by simply solving for ground torque,
GROUND TORQUE = lex + BRAKE TORQUE
Assuming that I is the known wheel, tire and rotating brake
inertia, and assuming I is constant, the two necessary variables that
must be available is brake torque, and wheel deceleration. Wheel
deceleration presents no problem because the wheel velocity is already
available and can be readily differentiated. Accurate brake torque
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information, however, is more difficult to obtain.
The SPAD system, discussed in Section III, approaches a brake
torque feedback system by creating a pseudo brake torque signal. This
signal is generated by filtering the servo-valve signal (See Figure 18).
The assumptions made here are that the valve to brake pressure and
brake pressure to brake torque relationships are known and can be
predicted. As the system is implemented there is another assumption
made which is that the wheel velocity term is adequate, thus eliminating
the necessity of obtaining wheel deceleration.
The SPAD system represents an implemented system which incorporates
the analytical conclusion that the optimal system will always maximize
the available ground force (See Reference HAS 8-28250 "Optimal Braking
Studies," August 1972). To facilitate this analysis, the basic con-
trol circuit utilized in the SPAD system is presented in Figure 19 in
simplified form (See Figure 13 for details). This discussion will
concentrate on the optimizer circuit. The manner in which the optimizer
is implemented and functions has already been presented in detail.
The proposed system dealing with the use of brake torque will only In-
volve certain aspects of the optimizer.
The SPAD system does not require the value of the ground force
but just an indication of its peak value. This is done by sampling
the ground force and holding the peak value whenever it is reached.
Once the peak value is detected an error is developed which acts to
reverse the pressure sweep direction. In this manner the peak value
acts only as a trigger to sense when the maximum ground force has
been exceeded.
Another approach which may be taken to more accurately simulate
ground torque is shown schematically in Figure 20. Notice that the
derivative of the wheel speed is not the true derivative but is
attentuated by a simple lag filter. This is necessary to keep
electrical noise to an acceptable level. Also the first and second
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order filters used to generate the brake pressure and brake torque
are linear approximations to the real dynamic relationship. Although
this is a more faithful simulation of ground torque than utilized by the
SPAD system, it is still just an approximation.
A look at Figure 21 shows what the actual frequency response of
the Space Shuttle hydraulic simulation may be. To simulate this
would require at least a third order system to generate up to 270
degrees of phase lag. But an additional problem requires simulating
the proper attenuation or gain response such that it coordinates both
the magnitude and phase plot. Of course, the more nonlinear the actual
dynamics to be simulated the more difficult becomes the implementation
of that simulation. Figure 22 represents brake torque frequency
response actually measured on a dynamometer. The task of simulating
this becomes quite difficult again because of the complexity and
nonlinearity of the dynamic response. The point that must be made is
that the simulation shown in Figure 19 is just an approximate simula-
tion, more complete than SPAD, but still not complete. This leads
to the desirability of having the actual measured brake torque for
purposes of simulating ground torque.
With brake torque available, simulating ground torque only requires
the wheel decleration signal. As pointed out before in this discussion,
there might be some undesirable aspects to this brake torque signal,
but basically the resultant ground torque simulation would be more
accurate. The proposed antiskid system will closely approximate the
existing SPAD system, but the more accurate ground force simulation
using measured brake torque will be incorporated.
The proposed system that utilizes brake torque can be seen in
Figure 23. The ground force simulation is made up of wheel decelera-
tion and brake torque. This ground force signal is not used to indicate
any absolute magnitude, but rather the peak value is important. To
detect the peak ground force it is proposed that the signal be differ-
entiated. This would have the feature of not only detecting the
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FIGURE 2^. PROPOSED OPTIMIZER USING MEASURED WAKE TORQUE
peak value but also using the inherent inflection point surrounding
this .maxima. The maximum detector shown in Figure 23 would have a
proposed characteristic shown in Figure 2k. When the inflection
point of the ground force is neared and reached, the value of the
derivative would diminish, becoming zero when the peak ground force
is reached. Using this ground force derivative to control the maximum
detector would enable it to provide a variable input to the sweep
integrator. This provides two operational changes to the optimizer.
First, the ground force signal is continuously monitored instead of
the sample-hold method. Secondly, the integrator sweep rate is
variable with the rate of change of ground force. Note the deadband
about the origin in Figure 2k. This is to help eliminate the "nervous-
ness" of the derivative signal in the presence of noise. Overall the
optimizer circuit would exhibit a signal more continuous in nature
than the basic SPAD system approach.
Practical details such as necessary noise filtration, width of
the deadband in the maximum detector and slopes or gains on the inte-
grator inputs would have to be worked out and refined during the
development of this proposed system. Obtaining the necessary stability
margins may be difficult with this system. These matters are beyond
the scope of this discussion, however.
DESCRIPTION OF THE BOEING CLOSED LOOP ANTISKID SYSTEM
The Boeing Closed Loop System evolved several years back as an
improvement of the Goodyear antiskid system used on the early 737"s.
This Closed Loop system was developed by Boeing and also is under a
Boeing patent. It was extensively flight tested on the 737 "Short
Field" demonstrator but never evolved into e certified system and
therefore has not been used on a production Boeing airplane. Never-
theless, the system recently has undergone some improvements to reflect
experience gained from past brake control system development programs.
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A block diagram of the system is shown in Figure 25 • There are
three control loops that constitute the basic functions of this system;
the skid detector loop provides full brake release to control deep
skids. It also serves as an initialization of the closed loop modulator.
The closed loop modulator provides the major control. It adjusts the
working level of the brake pressure to adapt to the varying runway
friction conditions. The second order lead loop provides dynamic com-
pensation for inherent lags in the systems; thus it acts to improve
overall system performance.
The skid detector provides a fixed amplitude signal whenever its
dual threshold is exceeded. This signal provides a full brake release
signal to the valve amplifier which releases all brake torque. This
signal also provides the initialization signal to the modulator via
the overtorque circuit. The skid detector dual threshold requires
that the wheel deceleration must exceed a fixed rate and at the same
time the change in velocity must exceed a fixed value. When these
conditions occur the skid detector releases the broke pressure and
initializes the modulator. The nature of this skid detector control
is mainly that of a backup control. Whenever "heel deceleration
exceeds the authority of the modulator, the skid detector provides
for rapid brake toraue release and lets the wheel recover to its
synchronous velocity. Thus the skid detector is assigned a minor
backup role.
The major control element in this system is the modulator (see
Figure 26). It functions by comparing the wheel deceleration to that
of a fixed deceleration reference and integrates the resultant deceler-
ation error. The output characteristics of the modulator can be
seen in Figure 27. When no wheel deceleration is present (at initial
brake application or during spinup after a skid) the modulator calls
for its maximum rate of increasing brake pressure. Pressure increase
will continue at a declining rate as wheel deceleration increases
until the deceleration detector senses a value equal to the level
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called the crossover deceleration (See Figure 27). This allows the
brake torque to ease the wheel into more and more slip until the
friction peak is momentarily met and then exceeded. The crossover
value is above the deceleration level that can be sustained by the
available tire-to-ground force so that the maximum permissible
braking force (torque) level is reached as the brake pressure is
easing upward. Once the peak available ground force is exceeded the
wheel deceleration will increase thus passing the crossover level.
Once the wheel exceeds the fixed deceleration crossover, the modulator
calls for a decrease in brake pressure, the rate dependent on vheel
deceleration.
Assuming the ground friction characteristics are not changing
drastically, the modulator can and will smoothly regulate the brake
pressure, keeping the braked wheel right at the ground friction peak.
If, however, the rate of wheel deceleration and change in velocity
exceed the skid detector threshold, the modulator is overridden by
the detector momentarily to release brake pressure and permit wheel
speed recovery. It is the function of the overtorque circuit to
then re-establish the modulator control after the skid detector again
becomes inactive.
Greatly assisting both the skid detector and modulator loops is the
second order lead control. The name second order refers to the fact that
it ideally takes the second derivative of any wheel velocity variation
and inputs this to the.valve amplifier. Of course, the amount of phase
lead is a function of frequency and since a filter must be added to
control electrical noise, the phase lead drops precipitiously at fre-
quencies above 15 Hz (£ee Figure 28). Even so, between 1 aid 12 Hz the
lead provided by this control aids the system in two very important
ways. First, it compensates for built-in inherent phase lags in the
system. Lags that occur in the velocity converter, lags that are
always present in the servo valve and brake hydraulics. This results
in substantially improving the phase margin and thus the stability
threshold of the system. Secondly, the lead compensation by its very
72
LJ
h
U
I
U
Q
4
D
J
a
DC
O
O
O
U
aJ
oo
73
derivative function leads or anticipates brake pressure correction
to begin corrective modulation before the regulator modulator can
respond. This results in an overall better performing system.
The remaining elements of this system are the summing
amplifier and the valve amplifier. The summing amplifier continuously
adds the signals from the three control loops and sends this signal
to the valve amplifier. Here it is amplified and converted into
current to drive the servo valve.
Such functions as touchdown protection and locked wheel protection
are not included in the system since it is only a developmental labor-
atory model. The servo valve used with this closed loop system is like
that shown and described in Section III, Figure 8. There is no actual
transducer proposed with this system. It was run in the lab using
a transducer simulation and was operated on the airplane with a
Goodyear transducer similar to that described for the L-1011 system.
(See Figure 2).
V. REDUNDANCY REQUIREMENTS TRADE STUDY
The first effort in this trade study was an evaluation of the
Jkj brake system to establish a baseline. Basic analysis of the
system was done by using Fault Tree techniques. This is a failure
mode and effect analysis method that offers a graphic evaluation of
multiple failures. The completed Fault Tree Analysis was used as
the basic reference for assessing component failures required to
give resultant critical system failures. An evaluation of the 7^7
service performance was completed to give a baseline safety require-
ment for the proposed Space Shuttle braking system. The baseline
safety requirement for the Space Shuttle system will be evaluated
against the proposed ground rules to establish the redundancy require-
ments to meet the baseline for each condition.
After evaluation of the 'ik'( it quickly became obvious that this
system was not a good baseline for Space Shuttle evaluation. The
large difference in number of braked wheels between the 7^7 and the
Space Shuttle makes direct comparison difficult.
The Advanced 737 system, having four braked wheels and the same
type antiskid system as the 7^ 7» represents a better choice. There-
fore the Advanced 737 system was analyzed. It, rather then the 7^7
system, was used to give a baseline safety requirement for the Space
Shuttle braking system. The 7^7 system Fault Tree Analysis will be
submitted for comparison purposes only (see Appendix).
REDUNDANCY REQUIREMENTS ASSUMPTIONS
Due to a lack of detailed information concerning the Space
Shuttle brake system requirements, the following assumptions were ,
made for purposes of assessing redundancy requirements:
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I. MISSIONS WHERE BRAKING SYSTEM IS REQUIRED.
o Return from space landing
o Ferry flight refused takeoff (RTO)
o Ferry flight landing
o Pre and post ferry flight taxi
II. VEHICLE BRAKING CONFIGURATION
o Four main gear braked wheels (2 per strut)
o Split rudder for speed brake
o No spoilers to dump lift
o Drag chutes
o No engines for return from Space landing
These assumptions were then used to develop the appropriate
ground rules for analyzing an antiskid system from a failure analysis
standpoint.
ADVANCED 737 BRAKE SYSTEM FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
Fault Tree Analysis is a failure mode analysis that graphically
depicts the progressive paths that, upon occurrence, result in an
undesired event. In this study the undesired event is inadequate
braking when associated with the selected ground rules. Since the
objective of this analysis is to establish redundancy requirements,
the analysis is simplified by not considering human inputs and the
electrical circuitry involved with testing and status monitoring.
Two basic logic gates are used in constructing a Fault Tree:
the AND gate, where all conditions leading to the gate must be met
for occurrence of the event and the OR gate where any of conditions
are sufficient for the event to occur. The AND /--\
gate can be visualized as a series of switches
which must all be on for current to flow while AND
the OR gate would be a set of parallel switches,
any one of which will complete a circuit. One
INHIBIT
other logic gate appears in the analysis and this
is the inhibit gate. In this analysis it is used
to represent systems with On-Off switching and
represents the status of the system. Specifically
it is associated with the auto brake and skid
control systems which the crew would have an
option regarding their use.
One other symbol is used extensively in the
analysis and this is the transfer symbol, repre-
sented by a triangle. The triangle with the
apex up represents an identical input, either
to permit continuance of the analysis on a
subsequent page or more significantly to repre-
sent an identical event as an input to more
than one branch of the Fault Tree. The transfer
symbol with the apex down signifies a similar input
with the same type, but physically different
components. The transfer symbol with the horizontal
input line represents the events to which the. other
transfer symbols refer.
The Fault Tree analysis is read from the top
with each branch depicting the events that are
necessary and sufficient to cause the undesired
event. This is continued until the component
level or at least an independent, easily defined,
event level is reached. The component failures
are shown in the fault tree as circles. The
independent events, such as loss of a hydraulic system are shown
as diamonds. The use of the diamond generally signifies an event
that could be further analyzed. For this application of establish
ing redundancy requirements, items such as the hydraulic sources
and support structure failures can be considered as single events
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without further analysis.
The concepts of necessary and. sufficient merit further defini-
tion. There are often features in a system which have no significance
to a particular analysis. In this study for example, the locked wheel
protection system gives brake release signals when a wheel slows up
more than a certain reference value. If the locked wheel is due to
normal braking variations, this constitutes normal operation of the
brake system and not a failure. If the locked wheel is due to a
failure in the system this does appear in the Fault Tree as flag notes
2 and 3 in the brake release Fault Tree. There are several failures
that can result in loss of braking efficiency, either mechanical or
electrical. This analysis is done on an all on or all off basis so
that these failures are not included.
Since the objective of the study is to recommend redundancy
requirements for the Space Shuttle in relation to specified ground
rules, the baseline analysis of the 737 will be used in concept only.
Figures 29 through UO represent the Fault Tree Analysis of the
advanced 737 brake system with the top events selected from the Space
Shuttle ground rules. Certain deviations are made from standard Fault
Tree techniques to enhance the readability of the presentation. For
example, Figures 38, 39 and UO which show combinations of wheel pair
failures can actually be inferred in evaluation of single wheel
failures.
Task III of this contract calls for investigation of techniques
for implementing a skid control system with electronic Fail Operational/
Fail Operational/Fail Safe, (FO/FO/FS), and hydromechanical Fail Opera-
tional/Fail Safe, (FO/FS) capability. Fail Operational is defined as
retention of full required braking capability, including skid control
after a failure when evaluated against the following conditions or
groundrules:
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(1) Assume all brakes and skid control must be operative (see
Figure Ul for Fault Tree).
(a) Brake energy capability of all brakes is required, or
(b) Stopping performance requires all four brakes to meet
field length requirements, or
(c) Three brakes required to meet (a) and (b) above but
asymmetric control problem exists with one brake
inoperative.
(2) Assume three brakes and skid control must be operative (see
Figure k2 for Fault Tree).
(a) Brake energy requirement is met with one brake operative.
(b) Field length requirement is met with one brake inoperative.
(c) No control problem exists with one brake inoperative.
(3) Assume two brakes (one each side) and skid control must be
operative (see Figure 14-3 for Fault Tree).
(a) Brake energy requirement is met with two brakes inoperative.
(b) Field length requirement is met with two brakes inoperative.
Fail safe is defined as retention of capability to stop the vehicle
after failure, however, precise manual control may be required. This
analysis only considers those components upstream of the brake assembly.
Fault Tree Analysis was the basic tool used in establishing the critical
modes of failure for the subject braking systems.
The Hydro-Aire Mark III system was selected as the baseline skid
control system for comparison purposes. This system is used in several
airplanes including the 7^ 7 and advanced 737. The complete brake sys-
tems for the 7^7 and 737 were analyzed by the Fault Tree technique.
The 737 system was selected as the overall baseline system since it
is a U-wheel configuration which is more comparable to the proposed
Space Shuttle than the 16 wheel 7^ 7. It should be emphasized that
the analysis of the 737 included in this document is in reference to
.groundrules specified for the Space Shuttle and should not be
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construed as an analysis of its capability in commercial service.
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
The Hydro-Mechanical System
It is the objective of this exercise to specify redundancy
requirements in order to achieve a hydro-mechanical Fail Operational
(FO), Fail Safe (FS) capability for the Space Shuttle brake system.
The results of the analysis of the Advanced 737 brake (baseline)
system and the redundancy required to meet the Space Shuttle objective
are summarized as follows:
o Ground Rule 3 - One brake on each side required. Single
failures in the baseline system (Figure UU) can result
in the loss of braking capability of one wheel. This
would be acceptable under ground rule 3 f°r fail operational
but a second failure affecting the wheel on the same side
would not meet the requirement, therefore, the system
cannot be considered FO/FS under this ground rule.
To achieve FO/FS under this ground rule, two failures
must be required to lose a single brake at least for the
inboard or outboard paJr of wheels. See Figure ^ 5-
o Ground Rule 2-3 brakes required.
The baseline configuration also would be fail operational
.under this ground rule although the probability of the
second failure state would be greater since any other wheel
failure would constitute system failure.
To achieve FO/FS under this ground rule two failures must
be required to'lose any brake. See Figure ^ 7.
o Ground Rule 1. All brakes required.
Single failures that result in loss of a single brake leave
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insufficient braking capability by definition, therefore under
ground rule 1 the baseline system is not fail safe after any
failure. Implementation of an FO/FS capability would require
three separate inputs to each brake. See Figure ^ 9.
The Skid Control System
The objective for the skid control system is FO/FO/FS. This means
that after two failures the system must be still folly operational with
the capability for reversion to manual brakes should further failure
occur. There are two failure modes in the skid control circuit that
can result in loss of braking, i.e., brake release signals and locked
brake signals. The redundancy requirements for the antiskid system
to meet the three ground rules are similar to the hydro-mechanical
system with one additional requirement, to be able to turn the systems
off and revert to manual brakes. Therefore, the skid control system
must have similar alternatives to those discussed in the hydro-mechanical
summary.
GROUND RULE 3 - Dual inputs to inboard or outboard pair (Fig.
GROUND RULE 2 - Dual inputs to all wheels (Fig.
GROUND RULE 1 - Triple inputs to all wheels (Fig.
ALTERNATIVE CONFIGURATIONS
For each configuration developed to meet the electronic FO/FO/FS
and hydro-mechanical FO/FS, an alternative configuration was developed
which may not meet the full redundancy objectives for the space shuttle
but does retain an extremely remote probability of failure. The
resulting six configurations are presented in a matrix with the relative
probabilities of failure under each groundrule shown for each config-
uration.
The Fault Tree Analysis has been used to establish critical
failure modes and the results will be used as the reference for dis-
cussion of Space Shuttle redundancy requirements. It is again noted
that referral to the baseline aircraft is under groundrules defined for
use on the Space Shuttle and does not constitute evaluation under
commercial service requirements. All numerical predictions are based
on standard reference data and are presented to show relative proba-
bilities only.
The recommended concepts for achieving electronic FO/PO/FS and
hydro-mechanical FO/FS are based on independent failure paths. Alter-
nate configurations vere developed which compromise the independent
failure objective but retain extremely remote failure probabilities.
Groundrule 3-1 Brake Plus Skid Control Each Side
o Electronic FO/FO/FS - Examination of the Advanced 737 brake
system shows no redundancy in the skid control input to each
brake. Therefore any skid control failures lead directly to
failure of the brake. Under groundrule three, loss of skid
control to one wheel is still acceptable for adequate braking
capability or FO. To achieve FO/FO no additional single failure
can result in less than one wheel per side available. This
is not true for the baseline configuration since the second
failure could be the brake on the same side. The system is
still considered fail safe since antiskid can be turned off
and an emergency stop made with manual brakes. Additions
to the baseline system necessary to achieve FO/FO would be a
redundant skid control system to either the inboard or out-
board pair of wheels. With this addition the only second
failure that could fail a wheel wouM be on the opposite
side of the aircraft thereby meeting the groundrule. A
refinement is required in the skid control logic to the
wheel pair with dual antiskid so that failures leading to
locked brake signals are detected and the affected system
deactivated so that the alternate system can continue to
control the wheel. This failure detection and switching
logic system is shown in Figure k$. An alternative approach
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vould be a failure detection system consisting of a sensing
light and pilot controlled transfer switch with transfer valve
at the hydraulic supply.
o Hydro-Mechanical FO/FS - The critical mode failures using
the Fault Tree Analysis of the baseline system shows single
failures which result in loss of braking on one wheel. As in
the case of the electronic input this is acceptable under
groundrule 3 as FO. If the additional failure affects the
wheel on the same side the system is unacceptable since no
brakes on one side cannot be compensated by steering and
rudder to achieve an emergency stop. Therefore a redundant
input to one opposite wheel pair is also required to achieve
hydro-mechanical FO/FS.
The examination of the hydro-mechanical system must be con-
tinued to insure that the redundant brake inputs are suffi-
ciently independent upstream of the brake assembly so that
there are no failures in hydraulic and mechanical sources
which can occur and negate the apparently adequate redundancy.
There are single point failures which result in loss of one
hydraulic system and the associated accumulator and consequent
loss of control of the inboard or outboard pair of brakes.
Even for failures where accumulator volume is still available
for emergency manual stop, skid control is not available so
that the brakes can be considered not operational.
Dual failures can result in loss of all hydraulics. A third
hydraulic system is, therefore, recommended to supply the input
to the selected opposite wheel pair to achieve FO/FS capability.
There are failures in the metering valve and in the mechanical
linkage to the valve which can affect both brakes on one side.
The metering valve failure modes can be eliminated by use of
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a separate metering valve for each of the above recommended
brake actuation paths or a total of three valves. The separate
valves eliminate the possibility of failures in the single
loadpath between the cockpit input dual valve shaft and the
individual metering valve pistons.
The mechanical linkage to the dual valve shaft has no single
open failure that results in less than fully operational brakes.
The possiblity of a jam does exist. Careful design can reduce
this risk to an acceptable level. A second open failure in
the linkage could fail both brakes so that an alternate fail-
safe mechanical brake on device must be provided to achieve
FO/FS. A triple loadpath linkage to the cockpit is a possi-
bility but a simpler method could be a hydraulic input similar
to the Advanced 737 automatic brake system, but designed for
emergency stop conditions rather than its present intent of
passenger comfort. If the Space Shuttle is to be operated by
a single crewmember, a second mechanical input is required to
replace the second pilot. This could be accomplished by either
a dual structure pedal arrangement or a hand lever.
o Proposed System - Figure U5 is a schematic brake system vhich
suggests the type of arrangement that vould be required to
achieve the desired redundancy under groundrule 3- This
system will be designated as Configuration A.
The predominant failure path in both the baseline and this
proposed Space Shuttle system is the hardware between the
metering valve and the brake assembly. Reasonable trade offs
in hardware upstream of the metering valve would not have
great effect on the overall system failure probability.
Alternate configuration A is therefore presented as shown
in Figure kb. The emergency braking system and the third
hydraulic system are eliminated.
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Groundrule 2-3 Brakes Plus Skid Control
o Electronic FO/PO/FS -" The recommendations made under groundrule
3 would not "be sufficient to provide FO/FO/FS under groundrule 2
since tvo failures could deactivate the single input wheel pair
and result in inadequate skid control. Therefore it is recom-
mended that dual skid control inputs be provided for each wheel.
The dual inputs must include logic to prevent locked wheel signals
from affecting both inputs. See Figure Vf.
o Hydro-Mechanical FO/FS - Dual hydro-mechanical inputs to
each brake assembly will be necessary to achieve FO/FS under
groundrule 2. With dual inputs, there are no double failure
combinations downstream of the metering valves which can result
in the loss of more than the allowed one brake. As discussed
previously, there are dual failures that can result in loss of
all brakes or both brakes on one side. To achieve FO/FS under
groundrule 2 it is recommended that an emergency brake control
be added using a third hydraulic system to provide a fail safe
capability.
o Proposed System - Figure Uj is a schematic brake system which
suggests an arrangement that would provide the desired redun-
dancy. The system will be designated as configuration B.
Reasonable tradeoffs under Groundrule 2 would be elimination
of the emergency brake actuation system and the third hydraulic
system. This would have negligible effect on the probability
of a single wheel loss and would still give a probability of
dual wheel loss equivalent to the loss of both primary hydraulic
systems. Figure U8 presents a configuration incorporating
these tradeoffs and is designated as configuration B alternate.
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Groundrule 1 - All Brakes and Skid Control
o Electronic FO/PO/FS - Since all brakes and skid control are
required under groundrule 1 each wheel must be FO/FO/FS. This
indicates a requirement for three independent skid control
inputs with proper failure detection and switching logic.
o Hydro-Mechanical FO/FS - Three independent hydro-mechanical
inputs to each brake are also required to achieve the desired
redundancy. Three brake actuation paths are also required.
o Proposed System - Figure k$ suggests a hardware system that
would represent implementation of the independent fault path
requirements. The system is designated as Configuration C.
The emergency actuator could be any device such as a solenoid
or pneumatic actuator which moves the metering valve to a brake
on position.
The emergency actuator could be deleted from this proposed
configuration with negligible effect on the overall failure
probability. The most likely failure path would then be in
the linkage from the metering valves to the cockpit. This
system will be designated as Configuration C alternate. See
Figure 50.
CONCLUSIONS
Groundrules 1, 2, and 3 are representative of the tradeoffs to
be made in final selection of a brake system for the Space Shuttle
vehicle. Table 1 shows an estimate of the weight, broken down by
subsystem, for each proposed configuration. The brake assembly
weight is included because it represents a tradeoff item due to the
different energy requirements under the three different groundrules.
Under groundrule 1, where all brakes are required, the brake weight
is minimum since they are sized to meet minimum energy requirements.
However, the cost of the electrical and mechanical hardware required
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to provide the desired redundancy would be maximum. Conversely, the
groundrule 3 design provides part of the required redundancy in excess
brake energy capability which increases the system weight but reduces
control system complexity and cost.
The space (wheel cavity volume) required to accommodate the brake
under ground rule 3 would make that configuration rather difficult to
implement. Also, field length requirements may be a factor prohibiting
this configuration.
The system designated configuration C required for electrical
FO/FO/FS and mechanical FO/FS would be very difficult to implement
because of the three wheel speed transducer requirement and the
triple brake actuation system requirement. Therefore, from a cost,
weight, and complexity trade standpoint, configuration £, or some
variation on it is optimum for the imposed conditions.
System and component weights shown in Table 1 are based on typical
present day aircraft design practices. This procedure for assessing
weight was used because space shuttle vehicle design details were
not available when this study was done. Some space shuttle vehicle
braking system component weights will be lower than those estimated
where new technology is applied in the design, e.g., titanium tubing
in the hydraulic system and integrated circuits in the antiskid
electronic system.
Also, the brake control system (pilot's pedals to the brake
metering valve) is assumed to be mechanical as in present day
operational jet aircraft. With an electrical control system, pilots
command could go directly to the antiskid valves and the metering
valve would be deleted. The weight of an electrical system would
be less than a mechanical system if special cable tension devices
are required due to temperature extremes. Also, space constraints
may dictate use of an electrical system.
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Tables 2 and 3 are presented to summarize the relative probabilities
of failure to meet the adequate braking groundrules for the six configu-
rations developed in this study. No attempt is made to select the
optimum brake system by failure probability only, but the information
contained in Tables 2 and 3 in conjunction with brake veight estimates
presented in Table 1 should provide the necessary decision information.
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VI. LABORATORY EVALUATION OF ANTISKID SYSTEMS
DESCRIPTIOH OF ANTISKID SIMULATIONS
The Boeing antiskid simulation used for this study consisted of
one of the available general purpose skid control simulations. The
complete simulation consists of an analog computer programmed to
simulate aircraft related dynamics while the braking system related
hydraulics is actually used directly in the simulation. Since the
entire simulation operates in real time, an actual aircraft antiskid
system can be tested directly. Both the computer simulation and
hydraulic implementation vill be described. See Figure 51.
Analog Computer Simulation
A general Boeing commercial aircraft type antiskid simulation
was used but rescaled and modified to reflect the dynamics of the
Space Shuttle. But the NASA specified Shuttle parameters (see Table
were incorporated with no major change to existing simulation models.
Several aspects of the Space Shuttle configuration and operating
envelope differ considerably from a typical Jet transport aircraft.
These influences were accounted for. The simulation consists of all
essential vehicle and landing gear system parameters which Include
the following:
o Vehicle static and dynamic characteristics
— Touchdown dynamics
— Pitching dynamics
— Aerodynamics
— Center of gravity and gear position
Gear Dynamics
— Shock strut (vertical motion)
— Shock strut (horizontal motion)
— Tire and wheel
&RAKE
CVEW
VALVE
PRESSURE
TRANSDUCER
HARDWARE
COMPUTER
BRAKE: TORQUE
TIRE
WHEEL
DYNAMICS
WHEEL VELOCITY
FOOTPRINT
GROUND FORCE.
STRUT ACCELERATION
FIG. 51 <bl/*\ULATOR BLOCK DIAGRAM
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o Brake Torque Characteristics
—Response
--Peaking
—Fade
o Tire-Ground Interface Characteristics
—Thermodynamic s
—Tire mechanical properties
—Tire dynamics
Hydraulic Simulation
The hydraulic related aspects of the antiskid simulation are
actually real hydraulic components. Line lengths and diameters are
implemented as they were Judged to be on the Space Shuttle (See Fig. 52).
From energy requirements and wheel size the 7^7A brake was chosen for
the simulation. The Space Shuttle was judged to have a brake-by-wire
actuation system so no metering valve was incorporated. Pilot's
brake pedal input vas simulated by an antiskid valve signal which
held off all brake pressure until the computer run was initiated and
then ramped up to 211 kg/cm2 (3000 lbs/in2) in 300 milliseconds. As
shown in Figure 52 the following components were used to generate the
proper hydraulic system response:
—Tubing
—Brake
—Accumulator
Both the analog and hydraulic simulation facilities used in
this study can be seen in Figures 53 and $k.
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Fie. 53 ANTISKID COMPUTER FACILITY
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FIG. 54 ANTISKID HYDRAULIC SI/AULATION1 "I.
DESCRIPTION OF LABORATORY SCREENING TESTS
The tests can be divided into three major categories:
o Stability Studies
o Performance - Adaptability Studies
o Operational Studies
Stability Studies
Freedom from gear walk is an important safety consideration.
Hence, the tendency of a skid control system to contribute to the
stability of the gear must be evaluated. The systems will be Judged
on their ability to provide damping to the strut motion or conversely
their tendency to couple into the oscillation thereby causing diver-
gence. The resultant strut vibration amplitudes produced by skid
control system operation will also be evaluated. The systems will
be tested at three different strut frequencies (^ .5 Hz., 7.5 Hz., and
11.5 Hz., 7*5 Hz. nominal) representing the change in natural frequency
due to different vehicle gross weights. Also this covers the expected
range of frequencies the eventual nominal strut frequency will be on
the Space Shuttle.
Test 1. Gear Walk
Purpose;
To determine the contribution of the skid control system to
landing gear oscillations (gear walk).
Procedure
During this run, the brake torque will be made to peak from its
programmed value to 1.5 times its value at critical times during
a stop. One example of a critical time is when the tire slip is
on the backside or unstable side of the friction curve. The
strut displacement will be monitored to determine the influence
of the control system on the strut stability. A range of both
gear frequencies and strut damping ratios will be tested.
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Performance - Adaptability Studies
The skid control systems will be evaluated under three cate-
gories, stabilized landings, touchdown profile, and notch mu steps.
These tests were chosen to provide a measure of their performance
and adaptability capabilities.
Test 1. Stabilized Landings
Purpose;
To measure skid control system performance under a stabilized
braking condition.
Procedure;
During these tests the Shuttle vehicle was braked at a pre-
selected brake application velocity of 33U km/hr (180 knots).
Maximum effort braking continued until the vehicle was brought
to a low velocity of 37 km/hr (20 knots) at which point the
braking run was considered stopped. During these tests the
available maximum mu was held at a constant value throughout
an entire run. Values used for each run varied. For runs
where the strut frequency was nominally 7»5 Hz the mu's were:
• 5, A, .3, .2, .1, .075* For both the U.5 and 11.5 Hz. strut
frequency runs the mu's were: .5, >2 and wet runway curve 1.
See Figure 55 for the wet runway profiles used in the computer
simulation.
Test 2. Landing Touchdown Profile
Purpose;
To determine antiskid system transient response to changing
load profile on the braked wheels due to shuttle vehicle bounce
upon touchdown.
Procedure;
During this test the normal main gear wheel load is taken from
zero to maximum (this upper value is, of course, modulated by
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the airplane pitching model depending on the amount of vertical
and rotational momentum transfer from main gear to nose gear)
in approximately 250 milliseconds. Then after another 100
milliseconds the load drops to zero and stays there for 200
milliseconds, then ramps back up to maximum in kOO milliseconds.
(Hote, this profile is a much simplified load profile but the
test is Intended to approximate a touchdown bounce and thereby
test the antiskid system's adaptability). Touchdown test was
only conducted at a mu value of .5.
Test 3. Mu Step Changes
Purpose;
To determine system adaptability to sudden changes in mu simulating
a series of vet spots or tar strips on an otherwise dry runway.
Procedure;
The computer run starts at a mu value of .$k and maintains this
level for approximately six seconds. Abruptly mu drops to a
level of .16, stays at this low value for 600 milliseconds then
just as abruptly changes back up to .^ U mu. This sequence of
events repeats every seven seconds throughout the braking run.
On the average five mu steps occurred during the actual tests.
The more inefficient system would be subjected to more steps
since they are a function of time.
Operational Studies
Tests in this group simulate conditions that are normally
encountered in aircraft service. The Shuttle vehicle could also
reasonably be expected to encounter these conditions in use. They
include:
Test 1 Wet Runway
Two typical velocity dependent wet runway profiles were used
to simulate wet and flooded runway conditions. See Figure 55.
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FIGURE 55- WET RUNWAY MU VERSUS SPEED - SPACE
SHUTTLE VEHICLE SKID CONTROL SIMULATION
Test 2 Landing Weight Variation
An upper and lover shuttle vehicle landing weight and brake
application velocity were tested. The upper was 100,000 kg (220,000 Ibs)
and the brake application velocity Has 352 km/hr (190 knots). The lover
range was 8l,820 kg (180,000 Ibs) and a brake application velocity was
315 km/hr (170 knots). These two weight and velocity ranges were tested
to expose the antiskid system to the expected operating range of the
Shuttle vehicle.
Test 3 Wheel Inertia Variation
An upper and lower wheel inertia were tested since a range of
rotating inertias could be expected depending on wheel and tire size,
material used and the composition and size of the brake. The upper
2 2inertia tested was 1^ .75 n-m-seft (20 ft-lb-sec ) and the lower inertia
was 8.85 n-m-sec2 (12 ft-lb-sec2); Nominally the inertia was 11.1
n ' n
n.m_ sec (15 ft-lb-sec ) used throughout the rest of the tests.
Test k Brake Torque Peaking
Low wheel speed braking can produce an Increased braking sensi-
tivity commonly called torque peaking. The antiskid systems were
subjected to this test to see how well they adapted their performance
to this condition. If a system does not handle this condition properly
the gear stability can become critical.
Test 5 Tire Heating
The projected load that each main tire is expected to support
will put the tire into a region of potential efficiency loss during
braking. The inflation pressure in the tire is expected to be much
higher than conventional commercial Jet transports. To account for
this efficiency loss a tire thermal effect must be added that win
reduce tire-ground available mu whenever the tire is slid beyond 10#
slip. What the simulation accomplishes is a reduced mu value momen-
tarily after any prolonged skids. Each system is tested to see how
well it can adapt to this situation.
Teat 6 Drag Chute
The Shuttle vehicle will deploy drag chutes upon touchdown.
Each antiskid system vas tested with a simulated deployed drag chute
to see how this affected the performance.
Test 7 Engine Idle Thrust
During the expected ferry mission of the Shuttle vehicle, there
will be air breathing jet engines attached to the Shuttle. As
happens on commercial Jet transports engine Idle thrust will provide
some margin of accelerating thrust which will tend to add energy to
the whole aircraft which the braking system must remove. This test
subjected each system to this condition to assess Its performance.
Data Recorded During Tests
The following data was recorded on pen recording charts to
facilitate analysis and evaluation of the various antiskid systems.
o Braked wheel speed
o Pressure downstream of antiskid value
o Brake pressure
o Brake torque
o Developed ground coefficient
o Strut displacement
o Valve signal
o Developed mu efficiency
The Mu-slip model will be monitored on the oscilloscope to
observe the control system operation. This is also considered
necessary to initiate some stability type tests.
Other measurements which are necessary to assess performance of
the various skid control systems are:
o Efficiency
o Stopping distance
o Skid index and cornering index
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These will be measured by a digital voltmeter and recorded for
all the tests. For purposes of these tests the developed Mu efficiency
vill be recorded. This efficiency measures the ability of a skid
control system to produce a high ground coefficient of friction. Mu
efficiency is determined by dividing the time integral of the developed
coefficient divided by the time Integral of the available maximum
ground coefficient. Skid index and cornering index are both measure-
ments dealing with how much any given skid control system skids the
braked wheels. Skid index is a measured accumulation of the skids, the
depths and the duration of each skid during each computer braking run.
Cornering index is somewhat of an inverse measurement of the skid
index. Whenever a braked wheel is driven into a deep skid, the
resultant cornering efficiency is driven very low. For purposes of
interpretation the lower the skid index, and the higher the cornering
index the more efficient the antiskid system tends to be. However,
the obvious case where the skid index is zero and the cornering index
is 100 is not indicative of an efficient system. Its indicative of a
free rolling unbraked wheel where no slip is developed.
EVALUATION OF LABORATORY RESULTS
Two antiskid vendors presented their systems to be evaluated,
Hydro-Aire Mark III system and Bendix Slip Command System. Goodyear
system and SFAD system vendors were each given an invitation to parti-
cipate but both declined. Included also in this section was the Boeing
Closed Loop System. This system was described in Section IV of this
document and the reader is referred to that for more details. The
tests have already been detailed so this section selected the more
salient tests and described them. Four tests were selected for
description and they represent the following:
o .5 mu run with b.5 Hz strut
o .5 mu run with 11.5 Hz strut
o Mu steps with 7.5 Hz strut
o Wet runway curve 1 with 7-5 Hz strut.
These four tests were selected to represent both dry and vet
runway braking runs. Both the low and high strut as well as nominal
7»5 Hz strut are represented in these tests. Also adaptability to
step changes in mn was represented. These four tests are described
for each of the three antiskid systems and the pen chart recordings
are represented in Figures 56 through 67. The remaining tests con-
ducted in this section are described with the aid of the tabulated
data in Table V and further represented in bar chart form in
Figures 68 through 108. The bar charts facilitate comparisons among
the system's tested for each given test condition.
Discussion of Fen Chart Recordings
The Bendix test results are shown in Figures 56 through 59.
Figure 56 represents a stabilized dry runway maximum effort stop with
a nominal strut frequency of U.5 Hz. The braking run began with the
wheel rotating at synchronous velocity equivalent to 33^  km/hr (180
knots). Since the Shuttle will be "brake-by-wire" type system, the
brake pressure was brought on by a current ramp signal which went
from full valve signal to zero in 300 me. The resultant pressure
rise is similar to that produced when the pilot rapidly applies full
brakes at touchdown. In a matter of kQO ma the brake pressure was
up to 211 kg/cm2 (3000 lbs/in2) which was more than sufficient to
decelerate the braked wheel. It took the Bendix system approximately
one second to adapt and stabilize to this braking condition. One skid
went to a 3^  percent slip and the second skid dropped to 27 percent slip.
There were at least two full valve release signals which were unnecessary
partly because the initial valve signal does not have sufficient authority
to allow the wheel to recover and also because there was not sufficient
pressure modulation. Referring back to Section III, the Bendix system
is described. Initially when the wheel deceleration exceeded the decel
limit the mono stable flip-flop triggered the slip command signal which
did not have sufficient costrol for dry runway skids to allow full
velocity recovery. The deceleration was momentarily halted but then
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increased rapidly. This then caused a full valve release signal,
dropped the brake pressure to retractor spring pressure vhich allowed
rapid velocity recovery. However, when the full release signal vanished,
insufficient pressure modulation took place and the brake pressure
o ojumped back to l*tO kg/cm (2,000 Ibs/in ), another valve full release
o o
signal then brought down the signal only 21 kg/cm (300 Ibs/in ) before
P Pdisappearing. The pressure then increased to 175 kg/cm (2500 Ibs/ln )
causing the slip command signal to retard the deceleration, but not
sufficiently to stop the deceleration. As this increased again the valve
signal pulled off insufficient pressure, the wheel decelerated again
causing a full release signal and allowing complete wheel velocity
recovery. This time after the full release signal was gone the pressure
was modulated sufficiently to prevent another skid. As pressure was
gradually brought on a skid was precipitated and the system is in
smooth command of the wheel velocity. Skids were sampled at about 1.25
times per second, and the control exhibited proportional correction
and adequate modulation. Except for some deflection associated with
the first rapid skid cycling, the strut was exceptionally well damped.
Figure 57 represents a dry runway stop with the nominal strut
frequency at 11.5 Hz. The pressure application was identical to that
described for Figure 56. The system seemed to adapt to the rapid
pressure application better in this case than the U.5 Hz case. As
o o
soon as the pressure reached 211 kg/cm (3000 Ibs/in ) the wheel went
into a 25 percent slip skid and the system responded with a full brake
release signal which allowed the wheel to recover. As no pressure
modulation remained when the release signal departed, the wheel again
went into a skid of 21 percent slip except that momentarily a partial
release signal halted the deceleration. However, being insufficient
the wheel continued its deceleration. This required another full
release signal which allowed the wheel to recover its velocity. At
that point came another partial release signal and the modulation level
kept the wheel from going into another rapid skid. Pressure was then
gradually increased until another skid was precipitated and the system
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regained fall control of the vheel velocity.
Skids vere sampled at a rate of about 1.25 per second. This
rate keeps up throughout the run until the stop vas ended. In con-
junction vith the earlier rapid cycling when pressure was applied the
Bendix system provided a two step response to skids that occurred
»
during the lov velocity portion of the braking run. Unless the braked
vheel vent into a deceleration as steep as possible the full release
signal is not activated. Intermediate akid decelerations always
cause just the slip command signal to react. Sensing that this is
not enough correction to allow the full wheel recovery eventually
the full release signal must provide complete vheel recovery. The
time elapsed while this two-step reaction occurs is approximately
80 ma resulting in a deeper and wider skid than normal. For instance,
if the proper brake release signal vere initially provided, the skid
would correspondingly be shorter and not as deep.
The strut motion was well damped reflecting the overall smooth
control of the Bendix system.
The next test condition shown in Figure 58 Involves dry runway
adaptability by subjecting the system to sudden abrupt changes in mu.
These mu changes drop the mn value from .5^  down to .16. The duration
of the low mu period is approximately .6 seconds upon which just as
suddenly the mu increases to .5^  again. These yield a mu-time
profile of a non-symmetrical square wave. The time between repetitions
is approximately six seconds. During the test each system is subjected
to k or 5 of these stepdown changes. With this many mu changes the
system's response can be observed under a variety of conditions. In
this Bendix test, Figure 58, the first mu change caught the system
in its recovery from a previous skid. Up until that first mu change
the test resembled a .54 mu dry runway stop with the nominal 7.5 Hz
strut frequency. When the mu suddenly dropped from a .5^  to .16 this
precipitated a p^ rtf*^  deceleration of the vheel since the brake
pressure vas considerably greater than vhat the tire-runway mu could
sustain. The skid caused a full release signal from the system which
allowed the wheel to recover. This first low mu skid was about a 30
percent slip indicating the system was able to very rapidly recover
since the skid was fairly shallow. Another skid came immediately
after and its depth was only 25 percent slip. The system had fully
adapted to the .16 mu condition and then the mu switched back to
• 5^- mu. At this point the brake pressure was considerably below the
required skid pressure so it was the task of the system to recognize
this condition and raise the pressure up to the skidding level.
One problem any system mast deal with is the strut activity.
Because that first low mu skid required a full release signal the
strut was fully released (this condition is more severe than real
life since the space shuttle would have two wheels per strut and the
interaction of those two separate brake systems might provide some
strut damping; they might not release together) also causing the strut
to oscillate considerably. This in turn caused velocity modulation
of the wheel speed which could be interpreted as skids by the antiskid
system. As soon as the mu switches back to .5U the remaining damped
strut motion caused enough wheel modulation that the system kept the
pressure low or unchanged for 1.8 seconds. After that the pressure
rapidly increased from a level of 8k kg/on (1200 Ibs/in ) to 196 kg/cm
(2800 Ibs/in ) in just .7 seconds. This meant that 2.k seconds elapsed
after the mu switched up to .$k mi until the subsequent skid.
Hormal skid sampling then continued for another three seconds at
which time the mu switches down to .16 again. This time the wheel
went into a 51$ skid, the system responded with a full release signal
allowed the wheel to fully spin up. Another skid of 32 percent slip
depth required only a partial release signal to correct the deceleration
condition. Before the wheel had time to recover under the .16 mu level
the mu switched back up to its .J& mu. level which very rapidly acceler-
ated the wheel up to its synchronous velocity. This time the skidding
pressure remained at the .16 mu level for 1.7 seconds with only slight
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change.
From that point on the pressure went from 105 kg/cm (1500 Ibs/in2)
to 207 kg/cm (2950 Ibs/in ) in .5 seconds whereupon another skid was
precipitated. Total elapsed time from the end of the low mu period to
the next skid was 2.3 seconds. There was considerably less large ampli-
tude strut oscillation with this particular mu change than the first.
What lowered the overall performance efficiency was the delay time after
every low mu period during which the pressure remained at a low level
instead of increasing to the higher required level.
The fourth test is shown in Figure 59* It is a wet runway profile
with the mu level varying as a function of aircraft velocity. Figure 55
shows the mu velocity profile used in this test. Basically the mu
value starts out at .11 at brake application and goes up to .k mu at the
end of the computer stop. When pressure was applied at the beginning of
the braking run, there was a period of 1.1* seconds in which 5 rapid
skids took place. The deepest and first skid was a 1*0 percent slip
followed rapidly by some more shallow ones. After each skid the modula-
tion was increased until the pressure finally lowered to the retractor
spring pressure and allowed the wheel to rotate at synchronous velocity
for 2.5 seconds. No braking took place during this period until the
modulation level finally decayed allowing the system to start skid sampling.
The time starting from the beginning of the run until the system adapted
and settled down to continuous control of the wheel velocity was four
seconds. This could lead to a significant loss of efficiency although
the system seems quite able to make up for this during the remainder
of the run.
A velocity profile such as this wet runway test provides an excellent
opportunity to see not only how the system adapts to very low mu start
up conditions but also how smoothly the system can keep up with the ever-
changing mu. There are obvious changes in the tire to ground wheel
acceleration dynamics due to the decreasing wheel speed, but on a wet
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runway the constantly changing mu also requires the system to further
adapt. Tae skid sampling for this system is maintained constantly
throughout the entire braking run, averaging 1.25 skids per second.
Only those last few skids at the low velocity end of the braking run
were complete lockups. The transition from the very low mu up to the
higher mu's for the Bendix system went smoothly. However, the poor
start up characteristics and somewhat inefficient very low mu control
left the overall performance down from what it might have been.
Stability considerations on the Bendix system were truly excellent.
This system used both a notch filter (the attentuation notch is "tuned"
in each case to the natural gear frequency) and a derivative lead control.
Together these provide system damping to the brake control loop which
in all cases actively damps the gear oscillations. Table VI shows that
the Bendix stability was better overall with the exception of the 7«5
and 11.5 Hz gear stability of the Boeing Closed Loop system.
Figure 60 represents the .5 mu dry runway test with the k.$ Hz
gear and the Boeing Closed loop system. Pressure was brought on with
the 300 ms valve signal ramp and when the pressure reached 196 kg/cm
rt(2800 Ibs/in ) a skid was precipitated. The system responded quickly
enough to where the wheel only went into a 12 percent slip on the first
skid. It imediately adapted to the dry mu condition and proceeded
with continuous control. In this particular test case where the strut
frequency was If. 5 Hz the system did not exhibit very good stability.
There are two reasons why this happened. First during the higher
velocity part of the braking run the skid sampling rate was quite high,
2.5 cycles per second. It can be easily seen how this sampling rate
could tend to excite the strut. The second problem deals with the
skid detector scheme this system uses to control deep skids. (See
Section III description of the Boeing Closed Loop system)* Once the
skid detector rate and velocity limits were exceeded the skid detector
released all brake pressure immediately and also initialized the
modulator to a very high level (low brake pressure). Once the level
136
was reached the modulator decay rate dictated the pressure reapplica-
P ' p
tion rate. Although this rate was 53.2 kg/cm /sec (760 lbs/in /sec)
the pressure started out at such a low level that it took three full
seconds before another skid occurred. While the pressure was reduced
the strut abruptly relaxed and oscillated. If the skid detector
initialization did not leave the modulator as such a high level, the
strut would remain more evenly and smoothly deflected, thus aiding
the strut stability. Thus the system stability at this strut frequency
was really deficient. The necessary inherent strut damping required
even to make this system marginally stable was nearly as much as the
other two systems needed to make them stable enough to complete the
tests. (See Table VI for comparisons of damping ratios).
Performance at the beginning and the entire high speed end of
the run was extremely good, but deteriorated rapidly at the low
velocity end. Primarily the reason for this was the skid detector
and its high modulation effect on the brake pressure. There was
also a tendency for this system to lockup below the velocity of
37 km/nr (20 knots).
The next test shown in Figure 6l was also with a dry runway,
.5 fflu but with the gear frequency of 11.5 Hz. In this run the
system stability and performance was extremely good. Again the
low velocity end was hampered by the skid detector and the tendency
to lockup at the end of the run.
The two final skids of this braking run made an effective
contrast. Pressure reapplication after the next to the last skid
helped to begin strut deflection and although there was strut
oscillations the system was able to actively damp them. Contrast
this to the last lockup skid where the system was unable to properly
remove pressure with the net result the wheel locked up, never to
recover. The strut oscillations were not large in magnitude,
but the damping was effected because the last skid was a lock
137
up. The damping was considerably diminished because full lockup tire
damping is negligible compared to the damping available on the stable
front side of the tire-to-ground friction characteristics. This lockup
condition also prevented the skid control system from any active damp-
ing role. Any strut damping that was exhibited must therefore be
inherent in the strut structure.
Figure 62 represents the dry runway step mu tests. Only the
first two steps are shown of the four that occurred during the tests.
Before the first step mu change the Boeing Closed Loop system performed
normally for a . 5^ mu dry runway condition. The pressure was brought
on by the 300 ms valve signal ramp and as soon as the brake pressure
p p
rose to 203 kg/cm (2900 Ibs/in ) the first skid occurred. It was
a very shallow skid and the system adapted after it to maintain con-
tinuous highly efficient control. This continued for the first 4.5
seconds until the first step mu occurred. Once the mu dropped to .16
value the wheel decelerated into a 59$ slip skid and the skid lasted
150 ms. Each low mu condition lasted approximately 600 ms but the
Boeing Closed Loop system reduced pressure so completely during this
skid that the brake pressure momentarily drained the brake, lowering
the brake pressure to reservoir pressure. This meant a further delay
in getting pressure re-applied and so the pressure did not even reach
skidding pressure for the .16 mu condition before it went away. Once
the mu switched back to .5U mu level the brake pressure was just that
much more below skidding pressure. From-the time the mu switched
back to .5^ until the system reached skidding pressure was U.8 seconds.
This situation caused a great reduction in efficiency since
the brake pressure was low at the start of this period and had to
gradually increase. The reason for this very poor adaptability
centered around the skid detector and its initialization effect on
the closed loop modulator. Much the same situation existed every
time a deep skid occurred during low velocity. The system's response
to the sudden drop in mu to .16 was adequate to prevent the wheel
from locking up but could still use some improvement. In other words,
looking at the valve signal shows that it hesitated for nearly 100 ms
before the complete full release signal was present. However, the
real deficiency in the system was its inability to adapt to changing
conditions. Once the skid detector initialized the modulator to a
high value, it then had to decay at a fixed rate. Thiu same situation
occurred no matter what the runway conditions were.
To verify this lack of ability to adapt to conditions the next
step mu change provided the needed evidence. This time when the mu
suddenly stepped down to .16 the wheel dropped into a ?8 percent slip
skid that lasted for 350 ms. During the remainder of the .16 low mu
period the system did not regain skidding pressure before the mu again
switched back to .5^ level. From that point until skidding pressure
was regained took h.k seconds. This was nearly the same amount of
recovery time that the system took during and after the first mu step.
This inability to adapt quickly to sudden changes in mu not only hurt
the system's efficiency but it also degenerated its ability to actively
damp the strut oscillations. As long as brake pressure was kept below
the brake retractor spring pressure the torque was negligible and
therefore the system was not actively in the wheel speed loop and could
not exert any control over the strut oscillations.
Not shown is the remaining two mu steps. The third step caused
the wheel to go into an Qh percent slip which remained 300 ms. It
took 3-9 seconds for the brake pressure to regain skidding level. The
fourth step mu occurred just after a normal low velocity skid took
place and the pressure was already moderated considerably. This meant
that when the wheel went into the .16 mu skid, the system was already
operating at a low pressure level so the low mu skid was responded to
more rapidly. The skid was only a depth of 57 percent slip instead
of a complete" lockup that was expected. Since the skid was caught
earlier in its deceleration, the skid depth and width was much lower.
Not as much pressure was released to control the skid so that the
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time to recover and regain skidding pressure was much less. 2.8 seconds
was all it took to regain skidding pressure. This apparent improvement
in adaptability really was just the result of the timing of the step
mu change and apparently not the capability of the system.
Figure 63 represents the wet runway profile test. The mu level
started out at .11 and increased up to about .UO at the end of the
braking run. The brake pressure was brought on with the usual 300 ms
valve signal ramp, but of course, at this low mu level a skid occurred
immediately. Its depth was only 25 percent slip and the system recovered
within 100 ms and continued controlling the wheel velocity. Initially
the efficiency was not at its best during the portion of the run where
mu was below .15. As the mu value increased above .15 the efficiency
steadily improved until the low velocity end where the skid detector
came into play. Strut damping was good until the very last skid where
the system never recovered and the wheel stayed locked up for 250 ms
until the braking run ended. As before the low wheel lockup caused
the strut to oscillate and damp out very slowly. With the system
effectively out of the loop because of the locked wheel it had no
further possibility of actively damping the strut, thus the slower
damped oscillations.
The first Hydro-Aire Mark III test is shown in Figure 6U. It is
a .5 mu dry runway test with the U.5 Hz strut frequency. Pressure
was brought on by the 300 ms valve signal ramp and when the brake
P Ppressure reached 193 kg/cm (2750 Ibs/in ) the wheel went into a
very shallow skid of only about 10 percent slip. However, there was
considerable ringing in the valve signal, brake pressure, wheel velocity
and strut. Since the frequency of the oscillations was 13 cycles per
second the U.5 Hz strut did not follow the brief excitation. However,
the six cycles of oscillation caused the system to reduce brake pressure
P p
some U2 kg/cm (600 Ibs/in ) but which was then increased to resume skidding.
From this point on the control was very highly efficient. The strut was
kept oscillating but this was because of the skid sampling rate of about
Ikk
2.5 skids per second. These strut oscillations were damped at all
times. Even during the low velocity skids the system was able to
prevent complete lockup skids. Pressure recovery after a deep skid
was extremely rapid serving to minimize strut oscillations and allow-
ing the system to actively damp the oscillations. This braking run
yielded very high efficiency throughout the entire velocity profile.
Damping appeared adequate although the test was run with a U percent
system damping.
Figure 65 represents a .5 mu dry runway with a 11.5 Hz strut.
Pressure was brought on by the 300 ms valve ramp signal and thei^  r)
pressure rose to 196 kg/cm (2800 Ibs/in ) causing the first of many
skids. Actually, the skids are just the result of excessive ringing
in the wheel velocity,brake pressure, valve signal and strut oscillation.
The strut oscillations diverged for 300 ms but then converged although
it took 1.6 seconds before the strut was finally damped. After this
first period the pressure regained skidding level and continued efficient
control throughout the remainder of the run. With the smooth continuous
control that the system exhibited the strut motion was well damped.
The low velocity end of the run caused progressively deeper skids which
in turn caused more strut activity. Although the strut motion was
damped it took progressively longer to damp out the oscillations as
the skids got deeper.
Figure 66 represents the step mu test. Initially the mu value
was .5^ and the brake pressure was increased by means of a 300 ms
p &
valve signal ramp. Pressure increased to 200 kg/cm (2850 Ibs/in )
and the system reached skidding pressure and again precipitated about
8 cycles of oscillation. This had the effect of lowering the brake
o o
pressure some b2. kg/cm (600 Ibs/in ) but as soon as the oscillation
damped out the pressure again reached skidding level. Although the
oscillations showed up in the wheel velocity, brake pressure, valve
signal and strut, the amount of wheel velocity modulation was slight;
the skids averaging only 10 percent slip values. Control continued
normally until the first step mu. When the mu dropped to .16, the wheel
velocity dropped into a skid with a slip value of 1*9 percent and lasted
only 200 ms. The system adapted to this so rapidly that it began skid
cycling while the .16 mu period remained. This .16 mu skid cycling was
very oscillatory but before the strut oscillations grew or the brake
pressure increased, the mu switched back to .5^ which abruptly stopped
all skid activity. From the switching point to the resumption of
skidding took only 2.2 seconds. Skid sampling continued as normal
then until the second step mu took place. This caused a skid which
had a slip value of 6? percent and width of 200 ms. Again the system
was able to adapt and began .16 mu level skid sampling while still
operating in this .16 mu region. The strut was more oscillatory during
this second step mu and kept oscillating until the mu switched back
to the .5^  level. Prom that point until skidding resumed was 1.8 seconds.
Skid sampling continued as normal until the third step mu. This skid
was very deep reaching a slip value of 97 percent and lasting 2kO ms.
This time the system was not able to regain skidding level during the
remainder of the .16 mu region. The strut oscillated violently during
this low mu period and did not damp out until the .5*+ mu level was
switched to again. Elapsed time was 2.2 seconds until skidding pressure
was reached again. Since this .5^ mu period was now during much lower
•wheel velocity, the skid sampling caused the skids to get deeper progres-
sively until the fourth step mu caused a lockup skid. The width of
the skid was still only 200 ms even though the wheel was caused to
lockup for ^0 ms. The system was not able to regain skidding during
the remainder of the .16 mu period although only 2.9 seconds was required
to cause another skid once the mu switched back to .5^ region.
Figure 6? represents the wet runway curve 1 profile. The charac-
teristics of this curve have been mentioned before in conjunction with
Figures 59 and 63 but basically the mu starts at .11 and increases up
to about .U value at the completion of the braking run. Pressure was
brought on by the 300 ms valve signal ramp but being a low mu a skid was
precipitated almost immediately. The depth of the skid was 38 percent
1U6
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and it lasted only ^5 ms. To control this skid the brake pressure was
dropped all the way to reservoir pressure but then jumped back to
<2 ^
approximately U2 kg/cm (600 Ibs/in ) and in the next two seconds
P Pincreased to 56 kg/cm (800 Ibs/in ) and resumed skidding. The skid
sampling occurred at approximately three skids per second and kept
this pace until the lower velocity end where the sampling slowed down
to less than one skid per second. Transition for this system from low
mu high velocity to high mu low velocity was extremely smooth. There
was a small amount of strut oscillation at the beginning of the run
but during the rest of the time except the very last three skids the
strut was very well damped. One thing that caused a slight loss in
stability at the beginning of this run was the system's tendency to
operate on the backside of the mu-slip curve. In other words, the
wheel velocity was momentarily kept from operating about the 10 percent
slip or maximum mu peak.
This condition lasted but four seconds and meant little or no
efficiency loss since the average slip value the system was controlling
to was not that significantly more than.10 percent slip. The efficiency
was very high overall throughout the wet runway run.
Discussion of Tabulated Test Data
The twelve figures just previously discussed (Figures 56 through
67) dealt only with four selected tests from each system. No attempt
was made to compare the system's performance within a given test among
themselves. This section will be devoted entirely to making perfor-
mance comparisons. Bar charts will be used extensively to aid in inter-
preting all the laboratory test data. The bar charts are found in
Figures 68 through 8V. They compare the three antiskid systems tested
for each test condition, indicating actual stopping distance, landing
distance efficiency and developed mu efficiency. Figures 68 through
8l deal with Performance-Adaptability Tests.
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Figures 68 through 70 compare results of the U.5 Hz strut stabil-
ized stops. Both the Closed Loop and Bendix systems were less effi-
cient than Mark III, with the Closed Loop being the lowest. Figures 71
through 73 represent the 11.5 Hz strut stabilized stops. The Mark III
system was more efficient with a shorter stopping distance than the
other two systems. But the Bendix system had more trouble with these
tests than the Closed Loop system and thus came out the came distance
on dry runway as the Closed Loop but longer on the .2 mu and wet runway
tests. All three systems stopped shorter with this higher strut fre-
quency then with the lower frequency.
Figures 7^  through 79 represent the nominal strut frequency of
7-5 Hz and also a range of operating mu's of .5 down to .075 in six
steps. In all these tests the Mark III system had the shortest dis-
tance except Figure 75 which represents the .k mu stabilized stop.
Except for the .2 mu run, Figure 77 the Closed Loop system had the
longest stopping distance. Figure 108 is a plot of the stabilized
landing efficiencies. Basically the Mark III and Bendix systems were
the two top performers and the Closed Loop system produced the longest
stopping distance and lowest efficiencies. The only exception was at
.2 mu the Bendix stopping efficiency dipped below the Closed Loop
efficiency.
Figure 80 represents the touchdown tests where the braked
wheels spin up upon touchdown but then leave the ground because of
airplane bounce. It's a test of adaptability and as such shows that
the Bendix and Mark III systems are equally efficient. The Closed
Loop system is relatively intolerant to changes in operating conditions.
The next test is the step mu test represented by Figure 81. It shows
the same trend for the Closed Loop system. Although all three systems
lost efficiency the Closed Loop lost the most. The Bendix system was
less efficient in adapting to the steps while the Mark III system was
the most efficient.
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FIGURE 68. PERFORMANCE - ADAPTABILITY TEST 1, .5 MU, 4.5 HZ. STRUT
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FIGURE 69. PERFORMANCE - ADAPTABILITY TEST 1, .2 MU, U.5 HZ. STRUT
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The remaining tests are called Operational Studies and comprise
seven different test configurations. The first test represents wet
runway studies and the results of both tests are shown in Figures 82
and 83. Both mu curves used in these tests are velocity dependent
and their profiles can be seen in Figure 55. All systems showed
relatively high efficiencies. Mark III system showed the highest
efficiency and Closed Loop the lowest. Bendix and Closed Loop system
had nearly the same stopping distance during the Curve 1 wet runway
test. Bendix and Mark III system had nearly the same stopping dis-
tance during the same curve 2 wet runway test.
Results of tests 2 through 7 can be obtained by consulting
Table V which is the tabulated data. Test 2 represents both the
higher and lower gross weights of the Space Shuttle. In general the
Closed Loop system showed the least efficiency and both the Bendix
and Mark III systems showed the most.
Test 3 represents both the lower and higher wheel inertia. In
these tests the Closed Loop system had the lowest efficiency and the
Mark III the highest. On the tests with the higher wheel inertia the
Bendix system efficiency fell down to the Closed Loop system level on
the .2 mu and vet runway curve 1 tests.
In Test If the sensitivity to brake torque peaking was tested.
Here the Mark III system was the best in stopping distance and effi-
ciency. The Bendix system performed better than the Closed Loop
system on .5 mu test but the .2 mu and wet runway tests, the two
systems performed the same. In other words the Bendix system suffered
more performance loss than expected.
Test 5 represents a tire efficiency heating loss test. Again
the same pattern held, namely the Mark III system was the most
efficient with the Bendix less than Mark III but better than Closed
Loop. The Bendix .and Closed Loop systems showed more tendency
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to lose performance on the low mu and wet runway tests.
The next two groups of tests dealt with addition and subtraction
of energy to the shuttle vehicle. Test 6 deals with deployment of a
drag chute while landing while Test 7 deals with the added thrust
during braking from engine idle. In general these tests verified
the findings earlier that showed Mark III system to be the most effi-
cient of the three with Bendix next and Closed Loop the last. Both
Bendix and Closed Loop systems lose efficiency on the .2 mu and wet
runway tests.
Discussion of Grading
The grading system used involved assigning certain points to
each system for each test condition. The weighting of the points
reflects the fact that some tests are considered much more important
than others. For instance a system's stability and adaptability are
considered far more important than its performance during an ideal
stabilized stop. In actual use the antiskid system will be subjected
to conditions that are constantly changing. These changes will tax
the ability of the system to adapt and stabilize where necessary.
Thus the grading points are assigned to grade stability and adapt-
ability tests heavier than the operational tests.
Grading Criteria
To facilitate the Interpretation of the results, a grading
system based on a total of 230 possible points was used. This grad-
ing system was the method used in rating the participating vendors'
systems. Each category is broken down into individual tests and
the distribution of points was as follows:
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Stability Studies
U.5 Hz. gear
7-5 Hz. gear
11.5 Hz. gear
Points
25
50
25
100 Total
Performance-Adaptability
Studies •
Test 1, It.5 Hz. gear
Test 1, 7.5 Hz. gear
Test 1,11.5 Hz. gear
Test 2,
Test 3,
Operational Studies
Test 1,
Test 2,
Test 3,
Test h,
Test 5,
Test 6,
Test 7,
Points
10
25
10
25
25
95 Total
Points
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
35 Total
Grading results shown in Table VII were arrived at by applying
the point schedule to Tables V and VI. For each test run the landing
efficiency was multiplied times the total points for that test condi-
tion. This procedure was used for tests under Performance-Adaptability
tests and Operational tests. Grading under Stability tests was more
subjective. Consulting Table VI shows what level of computer strut
damping was required to reach the limit of operational stability called
marginal stability in the table. Since tests could not be run at
these low damping ratios another level of damping was chosen for each
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TABLE VI COMPARISON OF SYSTEM STRUT DAMPING RATIOS
ANTISKID SYSTEM
GEAR
FREQUENCY
DAMPING
RATIO f COMMENT
Bendix Slip Command
Boeing Closed Loop
Hydro-Aire Mark III
14.5 Hz
7.5 Hz
11.5 Hz
Hz
7.5 Hz
11.5 Hz
U.5 Hz
7.5 Hz
11.5 Hz
0.0*
3.0*
0.3*
1.636
3.5*
3.0*
3.5*
U.O*
0.0*
o.&f,
U.o*
2.7*
5.0*
Marginal stability
Test run at this
damping
Marginal stability
Tests run at this
damping
Marginal stability
Tests run at this
damping
Marginal stability
Tests run at this
damping
Marginal stability
Tests run at this
damping
Marginal stability
Tests run at this
damping
Marginal stability
Tests run at this
damping
Marginal stability
Tests run at this
damping
Marginal stability
Tests run at this
damping
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system to conduct the rest of the tests. Both damping ratios were
taken into consideration when the grading was done.
The total points each system earned appears at the bottom of
Table VII. It shows that both the Bendix and Hydro-Aire Mark III
system to be nearly equal in points total. This should not be con-
strued to mean that their performance was equal. In the majority of
tests the Mark III system was the better performer in terms of
landing distance but also noteworthy, the spread in distance was
not great. Where the Bendix system excelled over Mark III was
stability. It provided more active damping to the overall system
such that a lower damping ratio could be sustained in the simulation.
The results of the Boeing Closed Loop system in the grading
was third place. This system in its present state of development
has not been flight tested. Before the present improvements were
made, the system was never certified, although it was flight
tested. The improved system is also not certified, but it does
show promise and with some further work could easily become a
credible brake control system.
TABLE VII SPACE SHUTTLE GRADING
Stability Studies
Test 1 U.5 Hz
Test 2 7.5 Hz
Test 3 11.5 Hz
Subtotal
BENDEC
23
1»3
21
87
BOEING C.L.
10
»»7
23
80
H.A. MK III
21
140
20
81
Performance - Adaptability Studies
Test 1 14.5 Hz
Test 1 11.5 Hz
Test 1 7-5 Hz
Test 2
Test 3
Subtotal
9-1
9-1
23.3
22.8
19.1
83. k
•9.0
9.2
22.7
20.6
17.5
79.0
9-5
9.5
23.8
23. u
22.2
88.6
TOTAL
POSSIBLE
25
50
25
100
10
10
25
25
25
95
Operational Studies
Test 1
Test 2
Test 3
Test li
Test 5
Test 6
Test 7
Subtotal
Totals
U.1
14.0
3.9
3.8
3.8
1».0
3.8
27. 1+
198
»».o
3.7
3.7
3.7
3.5
3.8
3.6
26.0
185
«4.1
U.5
l».3
U.2
»».l
M
U.2
29.7
199
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
35
230
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VII. SPACE SHUTTLE HARDWARE CRITERIA
What in the way of hardware is needed to implement an antiskid
system for the space shuttle? Assume for the sake of this discussion
that such design items as the tire, wheel, brakes, main gear strut,
aerodynamics and hydraulic system are already firmly determined. This
leaves the brake actuation system, hydraulic supply and return, wheel
speed transducer and antiskid control card, antiskid valve and brake
(its dynamic related properties) to be selected and determined. Each
of these items will be discussed separately and where practical, support-
ing laboratory data presented. The Boeing Closed Loop system was used
to conduct a sensitivity analysis to determine what effect these hardware
components have on the total system performance, stability and safety.
It is assumed that this Space Shuttle system will utilize a
"brake-by-wire" actuation system. The normal pilot control cables
will not be used to meter or actuate brake pressure. Instead pedal
transducers will receive pedal inputs from the pilot. The electrical
signal from the transducers will be processed and transmitted to the
antiskid valves individually or to a separate metering valve if it is
used.
Instead of the conventional cable rigging originating at the pilot's
pedals and transmitting signals to a metering valve, the individual
valves become metering valves. In other words an additional electrical
signal is sent to each valve relaying pilot's input signals. In con-
junction with this signal is the conventional antiskid signal which
is free to modulate brake pressure in the event the pilot's signal
exceeds the ground mu capability of the braked wheel and it begins to
decelerate too rapidly.
Since this system would eliminate the metering valves and cable
rigging and replaces them with this electrical transmitting system,
certain safeguards must be built into the systems. One proposal
would be to have tripple redundant pedal transducers attached to each
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pilot's pedals. All position transducers would transmit their respective
signals to a receiving circuit which would then vote or select which
signal or pair of signals to send to the valves. This voting scheme
is necessary to eliminate one bad signal from disturbing the true
pedal position signal. An accepted means of implementing this is
called "mid-value logic" and it requires tripple redundant input
signals. It chooses the correct signal by comparing any two agreeing
signals and rejects the third. An exhaustive analysis of a brake-by-
wire system is really outside the scope of this discussion except that
it is mentioned here for the sake of completeness. The pilot brake
pedal input will be assumed available to the antiskid system throughout
the rest of this analysis. If the actuation system incorporates a
separate metering valve, it will be assumed to have sufficient flow
and to have no tendency to self excite or oscilate that portion of the
hydraulic system pertinent to the brake control system.
Items that do have significant importance in the antiskid system
are the servo valve, wheel speed transducer, brake assembly and hydrau-
lic system. These hardware items play an extremely important function
in determining the antiskid performance. Their total impact will also
depend on which antiskid control circuit is used. For this study the
Boeing Closed Loop system was the only one used.
ANTISKID VALVE
The antiskid valve chosen for the space shuttle must meet some
tolerance or sensitivity objectives. Some of- the more important ones
deal with sensitivity to vibration and hydraulic back pressure. The
successful valve must not show failure or loss of performance to
expected levels of mechanical vibration or hydraulic back pressure.
In addition there are different types of valves such as pressure
control or flow control, overlap or underlap, and jet pipe or flapper
nozzle. The conventional valve used in commercial jet transport anti-
skid systems is the pressure control type and most systems use a
flapper type first stage design. Although the Bendix system uses a
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Jet pipe first stage its second stage is the conventional pressure
control type.
These specific details of valve design are not intended for dis-
cussion in this report except to indicate that the valve type used
must be capable of efficient pressure modulation in the expected
frequency range and step function response range. Quiescent antiskid
valve leakage is an important aspect in commercial aircraft from the
standpoint of parking. When all hydraulic power is shut off the
accumulator in the hydraulic system maintains sufficient pressure to
the brakes to allow a locked brake parking mode. Excessive antiskid
valve leakage would prevent the accumulator from maintaining its
charge for any length of time. This parking mode might not be a con-
sideration for the space shuttle so the discussion will continue with
other performance aspects of the antiskid valve.
Two different valve types will be compared in this study, over-
lapped and underlapped. The Boeing Closed Loop system was run with
both valves and comparative data will be presented. Pressure gain
plots were taken with each valve as well as brake release and fill
pressure recordings were taken. In addition, brake pressure frequency
response data were taken for each valve. Comparing and analyzing
these data will demonstrate the performance and dynamic differences
of these two valve types.
In describing these different hydraulic, brake and antiskid
valve configurations, keep in mind that the normal configuration re-
ferred to in this study consists of the ^ 32 cm (170 in.) brake line
length, 3-way antiskid valve, 7^ 7A brake and Boeing Closed Loop System.
This is the system configuration used during testing of the Boeing
Closed Loop system conducted and reported in Section VI.
The pressure gain curve shown in Figure 85 is representative
of an underlapped valve (See Figure 8 for more details on this 3-way
P P
valve). Pressure change from fully opened 211 kg/cm (3000 Ibs/in )
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pressure down to reservoir pressure is characterized by a smooth
transition. Hysteresis throughout the operating range of the valve
is kept to a minimum so that whether the direction of pressure change
is from low to higher or high to lower, any given current signal to
the first stage will yield a closely determined pressure. This becomes
especially important for wet runway performance. The pressure gain
plot of the 737 Goodyear overlapped valve is shown in Figure 86. This
valve functionally is the same as the valve used on the Boeing 7^7
antiskid system and is shown in Figure 5- Where the Goodyear valve
differs is that it has an overlapped spool design whereas the 7^7 anti-
skid valve is underlapped. Comparing the pressure gain curve in Figure
86 with the curve in Figure 85 indicates the differences in the valve
designs. The overlapped valve has a characteristic lack of smoothness
plus some very wide hysteresis at the low pressure, high current region.
(Note that this valve requires only 20 milliamperes full signal while
other valves require 50. This just reflects the difference in the
first stage electrical impedance). Also the characteristic "S" shape
of the three way valve is not necessarily characteristic of an under-
lapped valve in general. It is the particular shape and characteristic
of this three way valve only.
The normal Space Shuttle hydraulic system with the 7^7 brake was
operated with both the Hydro-Aire 3-way valve and the Goodyear valve.
Figures .87 and 111 are the resultant frequency response plots. Since
tp
both plots were made by operating the system about 105 kg/cm (1500p
Ibs/in ) the overlap characteristic of the Goodyear valve was not
apparent. This pressure as seen in Figure 86 is in a region of very
little hysteresis. The Goodyear valve has less damping (See Figure 87 )
than the 3-way valve (See Figure 21). This means the gain is higher
in the Goodyear valve up to about 12 Hz and the phase lag is lower
with the Goodyear valve up to about 8.5 Hz. than the 3-way valve.
The 3-way valve has more damping and above 9 Hz. has less phase lag
than the Goodyear valve. These characteristics translate themselves
into the performance shown in Figure 88 . The Closed Loop system
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was run with each valve (tuned for maximum performance for each con-
dition run) and the results on dry runway are very similar. The
3-way valve just slightly out performs the Goodyear valve.
Figures 89
 and 90 show the performance on low mu and wet runway
conditions. Here the 3-way valve is decidedly superior. The 3-way
valve can also be expected to provide better stability for a system
since its phase lag above 9 Hz. is less than the Goodyear valve.
Stepdown and step up response tests with the 7^7 brake and Good-
year valve (see Figure 92 and 93) are compared with the response of
the 3-way valve and 7^7 brake. The Goodyear valve is more sluggish
to respond both up and down than the 3-way valve. This test really
shows up the performance difficulty with an overlapped valve. This
also helps explain the wet runway and low mu performance deterioration
of the Goodyear valve.
BRAKE DYNAMICS
Assuming that Space Shuttle brake energy requirements dictate
the brake heat sink weight and remaining torque requirements, what
can the antiskid system expect from the brake in the way of hydraulic
brake actuation response? To maximize braking efficiency the antiskid
system wants a brake that gives good frequency response and good step
function response. It also wants a brake that doesn't provide excessive
squeal or chatter or has unnecessary hysteresis or torque peaking.
Several test combinations were set up and run to show what trends and
what extent the brake features into antiskid performance.
Figure 91 shows a plot of brake pressure versus volume for the
737 and 7^ 7 brake. Physically the 737 brake is much smaller than the
7^7 and as might be expected there exists considerable difference in
the brake volumes. This difference translates into step response per-
formance difference. Using the same 3-way valve the step down response
(see Figure 92) and step up response (see Figure 93 ) tests were
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conducted both with the 737 and 7^7 brake. It can be seen that the
737 brake is quicker to respond to step function commands than the
7U7 brake.
When the Closed Loop system was run with the 737 brake the per-
formance difference can be seen in Figures .88 through 90 . Only
very slight performance improvement can be seen. So it seems that
although differences can be detected in the two brakes as far as step
function responses are concerned the performance improvement from using
the 737 brake is not significant.
There are also differences in the se two brakes concerning the
brake torque response. Recently conducted tests have verified that
the 737 brake torque response phase lag up to 20 Hz can easily be
neglected. The 7^7 brake on the other hand has more response lag.
The simulated brake torque response used throughout the Space Shuttle
testing has the characteristics shown in Figure 9^ • Figures 88
through 90 show what the performance effect is by having the brake
torque response in the simulation (observe the performance under
"normal configuration") and removing this response entirely. Removing
the lag produces improved performance on dry and even more performance
on .2 mu and wet runway. This indeed shows a clear trend that brake
torque lag hurts the system efficiency. It also plays a destabilizing
effect as far as strut stability is concerned.
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
Another important aspect of the brake control system involves
some form of criteria about the hydraulic system (that portion of the
hydraulic system or systems that contribute to the antiskid system).
Hydraulic system flow and supply pressure will be designed by some
other criteria such as flight control system or landing gear actuation
system needs. But such things as line length and diameter especially
from the antiskid, valve to the brake and return line away from the
valve can and do play an important part in the system's overall
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performance. In some applications return line accumulators have been
used to aid the valve response.
One item was looked at and that deals with brake line length.
Referring back to Figure 52, 1+32 cm (l?0 in.) of brake line exist
between the antiskid valve and the ?6 cm (30 in) flex line in the
normal testing configuration. For this test the entire ^ 32 cm (170 in)
line was removed leaving only the flex line between the valve and
brake. The results show up in Figure 95 in the hydraulic frequency
response. Compared to the normal response plot in Figure 21 the
response is considerably quicker. For instance at 10 Hz. the phase
lag is nearly 18 degrees less. The Closed Loop system was run with
this short line configuration with the results shown in Figure 88 .
This shows that performance wise the change made virtually no improve-
ment, in fact a slight loss in performance. This reduced phase lag
could be used to great advantage to help stabilize a system.
WHEEL SPEED TRANSDUCER
Although no formal testing was done with any wheel speed trans-
ducers it was felt that any discussion of criteria could not be
complete without a discussion of them. Some aspects of the trans-
ducers were mentioned in conjunction with the system description in
Section III. Again under the ratings that were conducted in that
section aspects such as signal to noise ratio, concentricity, signal
strength were mentioned. Along with the desirability of the trans-
ducer wheel speed signal to be free of objectionable noise, sensitivity
to electro-magneter interference, the unit must also tolerate moisture,
vibration and be relatively maintenance free. A very highly successful
design has been the inductive FM alternator type.
Not all aspects of antiskid system criteria have been dealt with
here. The task of integrating all details of a complete brake control
system are numerous and complicated. It is hoped that this section
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has shown at least some of the trends that changes in hardware design
have on the system. Hot the least of the design choices is which
antiskid system to use. Two commercially available systems were tested
and the results described in Section VI. Depending on which system is
chosen for use, some of the other component criteria may or may not
be as important as when some other system is chosen for use.
In summary:
o Antiskid Valve - Optimize frequency response; minimize leakage,
o Brake Dynamics - Minimize brake actuator volume to improve response
time.
o Torque Dynamics - Minimize brake torque lag
o Hydraulic System - Minimize brake line length, minimize return back
pressure, optimize line size,
o Wheel Speed Transducer - Strong signal to noise output, insensitivity
to electromagnetic interference and vibration.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This contract investigated the subject of applying commercial
airplane type brake control systems to the Space Shuttle. The two
systems that fully participated in this contract were Hydro-Aire and
Bendix. Both systems were found to be applicable to the Space Shuttle
both in design and in observed performance. Both systems would have
to be upgraded to space flight specifications but no impediment was
seen to prevent this.
It was also concluded that to achieve fully implemented Fo/Fo/Fs
electronical and Fo/Fs hydromechanical capability would entail a signi-
ficant increase in system complexity, cost and weight over the con-
ventional commercial aircraft rated system.
Further it was concluded that any judgment of the two systems
(Goodyear L-1011 System and SPAD Concorde System) that did not parti-
cipate in the lab screening (Section VT) would be premature and
incomplete. To be adequately compared and judged, the tests conducted
on the antiskid simulation with actual antiskid vendor hardware are
necessary. The only information that was available about these two
systems was furnished by their manufacturers and in the form of system
description.
Based on the grading system used in Section VI the Hydro-Aire
Mark III system and Bendix SST Systems accumulated scores only one
point apart out of a total of 230 possible. Based on the compatibility
study grading in Section III the Hydro-Aire Mark III system scored ten
points higher than the Bendix SST system out of a total possible of 75«
This would give a slight edge to the Hydro-Aire Mark III System based
On overall system complexity, reliability, performance and stability.
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IX. RECOMMENDATIONS
The value of an antiskid simulation to the development of an
aircraft braking system is its ability to simulate the vehicle
dynamics itself. This enables changes to be made to the brake
control system readily without incuring the high penalty for operating
a flight test aircraft for the same test. Chiefly the properly con-
ducted simulation and brake control development program can vastly
reduce the technical risks and economic expenditures of a flight test
development program. In fact the timely use of a brake control simu-
lation can greatly reduce the design risks and prevent delays in the
Space Shuttle vehicle development.
Eventually, when a flight test vehicle is available, actual
vehicle braking performance data can be generated and compared to simu-
lator data. Minor adjustments to the simulation can then be made as
required for final antiskid system fine tuning. Thus, optimum brake
control system performance can be achieved through minimum flight
test effort and minimum risk.
Finally it is recommended that the results from this study be
utilized in gaining familiarity and knowledge about the subject anti-
skid systems in this report. Also use of laboratory tests such as
described and used throughout this study be made to assist in
selecting an antiskid system that best matches the needs of the Space
Shuttle.
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APPENDIX I
BRAKE SYSTEM FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
Figures 96 through 106 represent the yVf antiskid system,
Hydro -Aire Mark III, Fault Tree.
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APPENDIX II
TABLE IV. SPACE SHUTTLE PARAMETERS FOR SKID CONTROL SIMULATION
Effective wing area
Drag coefficient (landing configuration
during braking roll)
260.1m2 (2800 ft2)
0.08
Lift coefficient (landing coefficient
during braking roll) 0.037
Engine idle thrust (sea level, Mach .3) 132 n/eng. (600 Ibs/eng,)
Engine idle thrust (sea level, zero velocity) 308 n/eng.
(1UOO Ibs/eng.)
Number of Engines (for ferry flight) k
Drag Coefficient (Drag Chute) 0.5
Area of Chute (two 6.1m (20 ft) diameter
chutes) 58.1to2 (628 ft2)
Height of Vehicle Center of Gravity
Above Ground
Mass moment of inertia of stationary
portion of brake per strut
Strut Natural Frequency
Mass moment of inertia of wheel, tire
and brake rotor assembly about axle
center line
Mass moment of inertia of the vehicle in
pitch about the center of gravity
Bate of change of engine idle thrust
with airplane velocity
Strut fore and aft spring rate
(15
5.9 kg-m2 (8 slug-ft2)
4-12 Hz (range)
8.85 - kg-m
(12-20 slug-ft)
3.79 x 106 kg-m2
(5.1U x 106 slug-ft2)
36.1 n-sec (2.^2 Ib-sec)
m ft
Empirical n/m
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APPENDIX II (continued)
TABLE IV. SPACE SHUTTLE PARAMETERS FOR SKID CONTROL SIMULATION
Vertical spring rate of main gear tire
18.2 kg/cm2 (260 psi)
Vertical spring rate of main gear oleo
Vertical spring rate of nose gear oleo
3.13 x 10° n/m
(2.1 x 105 Ib/ft)
2.U15: x 10 n/m
(1.62 x 105 Ib/ft)
8.95 x 105 n/m
(6 x 10U Ib/ft)
Vertical spring rate of the nose gear tire 2.013 x 10 n/m
(29 x 7.7-15) 18.2 kg/cm2 (260 psi) (1.35 * 105 Ib/ft)
Effective length of main gear strut
Horizontal distance between nose gear
and vehicle center of gravity
(9 ft)
13.2m (1*3.3 ft)
Horizontal distance between main gear
and vehicle center of gravity
Total mass of vehicle
Total effective mass at end of strut
Total effective mass of tire, wheel and brake
rotor assembly
Brake retractor spring pressure
Roll radius of the tire (free radius
minus 1/3 deflection)
Torque radius of the tire (free radius
minus deflection at
(8.33 «)
91,000 kg (200,000 Ibs)
500 kg (3^.2 slug-ft2)
189 kg (13 slug-ft2)
17.58 kg/cm2 (250 psi)
0.518m (1.7 ft)
Brake torque gain (torque per unit
pressure)
Vehicle weight
.466m (1.53 ft)
1
-
163 Syr 2 (12 ffc*b )
UUOOO n (200,000 Ibs)
Angular velocity at beginning of torque peaking 30 rad/sec
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